MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 02976fam a2200397 a 4500
001 1905199
005 20220609023613.0
008 960702t19961996kyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96030435
020 $a0813119987 (alk. paper)
020 $a0813108950 (pbk. : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)35145780
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm35145780
035 $9ALZ8192CU
035 $a(NNC)1905199
035 $a1905199
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aUA23$b.P3747 1997
082 00 $a327.1/7$220
100 1 $aPayne, Keith B.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81152509
245 10 $aDeterrence in the second nuclear age /$cKeith B. Payne.
260 $aLexington :$bUniversity Press of Kentucky,$c[1996], ©1996.
300 $axiv, 168 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $tForeword /$rColin S. Gray --$gCh. 1.$tIntroduction --$gCh. 2.$tNew Environment, New Requirement --$gCh. 3.$tThe Valor of Ignorance --$gCh. 4.$tSuccess, Motivation, Mistakes, and Uncertainty --$gCh. 5.$tReconsidering the Hubris of Past and Present --$gCh. 6.$tSummary and Conclusion.
520 $aKeith Payne begins by asking, "Did we really learn how to deter predictably and reliably during the Cold War?" He answers cautiously in the negative, pointing out that we know only that our policies toward the Soviet Union did not fail.
520 8 $aWhat we can be more certain of, in Payne's view, is that such policies will almost assuredly fail in the Second Nuclear Age - a period in which direct nuclear threat between superpowers has been replaced by threats posed by regional "rogue" powers newly armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
520 8 $aThe fundamental problem with deterrence theory is that it posits a rational, reasonable - hence predictable - opponent. History frequently demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its approaches to regional powers. No one model of deterrence can cover all contingencies, and in some cases deterrence theory simply may not apply.
520 8 $aHe reveals why, particularly in light of political reluctance to use nuclear weapons, U.S. power projection forces may be the mainstay of U.S. regional deterrence threats in the foreseeable future. Yet because conventional forces are likely to be inadequately "fearsome" to deter in some cases, the nuclear threat must not be moved completely into the background, else we could be deterred by those we seek to deter.
651 0 $aUnited States$xMilitary policy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140379
650 0 $aDeterrence (Strategy)$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85037301
650 0 $aWorld politics$y1989-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004173
852 00 $bleh$hUA23$i.P3747 1996