MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 02265fam a2200361 a 4500
001 1956922
005 20220609035011.0
008 940203s1995 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a 94001872
020 $a0521236894 (hardback)
035 $a(OCoLC)29845278
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm29845278
035 $9AMF7685CU
035 $a(NNC)1956922
035 $a1956922
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aHJ2305$b.G84 1995
082 00 $a336.2$220
100 1 $aGuesnerie, R.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n80053054
245 12 $aA contribution to the pure theory of taxation /$cRoger Guesnerie.
260 $aCambridge ;$aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c1995.
300 $axv, 299 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $a[Econometric Society monographs ;$v25]
500 $aSeries statement from jacket.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 283-292) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tInstitutional economics of taxation --$g2.$tPositive economics: the structure of tax equilibria --$g3.$tNormative economics of taxation: reform and optimization --$g4.$tNormative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform --$g5.$tPolitical economics of taxation.
520 $aThis book investigates the way in which tax systems affect economic efficiency and the distribution of welfare. It examines within a unified framework questions that are usually treated in different areas of the literature: institutional economics, positive economics, normative economics, and political economics. It adheres to the rigorous standards of pure theory while paying careful attention to the policy relevance of the arguments.
520 8 $aTax systems are viewed as information extracting devices that generate sets of equilibria of complex geometry. A tax reform methodology is proposed that sheds light on optimal taxes. Social conflicts in the determination of taxes are shown to have effects on social cohesion.
650 0 $aTaxation.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846
830 0 $aEconometric Society monographs ;$vno. 25.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84716218
852 00 $boff,bus$hHJ2305$i.G84 1995