MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03779fam a2200445 a 4500
001 1972079
005 20220609041247.0
008 960814s1997 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96036254
020 $a0521585163 (hardback)
020 $a0521585279 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)503207733
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn503207733
035 $9AMH7298CU
035 $a(NNC)1972079
035 $a1972079
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aJF1001$b.C69 1997
082 00 $a324.6$220
100 1 $aCox, Gary W.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n85266859
245 10 $aMaking votes count :$bstrategic coordination in the world's electoral system /$cGary W. Cox.
260 $aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c1997.
263 $a9704
300 $axiv, 340 pages ;$c22 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction --$g2.$tDuverger's propositions --$g3.$tOn electoral systems --$g4.$tStrategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems --$g5.$tStrategic voting in multimember districts --$g6.$tStrategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems --$g7.$tSome concluding comments on strategic voting --$g8.$tStrategic voting, party labels, and entry --$g9.$tRational-entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan --$g10.$tPutting the constituencies together --$g11.$tElectoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties --$g12.$tCoordination failures and representation --$g13.$tCoordination failures and dominant parties --$g14.$tCoordination failures and realignments --$g15.$tConclusion --$gApp. A.$tFormulaic structures in 77 democracies, circa 1992 --$gApp. B.$tNotation and proofs for Chapter 6 --$gApp. C.$tData and sources for Chapter 11.
520 $aPopular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Professor Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political actors must solve. Under plurality rule, for example, not every leftist aspirant for the presidency can run at once, if the Left is to have a good chance of winning.
520 8 $aBut although all leftists will benefit from unifying behind a single candidate, they may not agree on which candidate that should be. Analogous coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems.
520 8 $aAlthough the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.
520 8 $aThis is also the first book that considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
650 0 $aElections.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041557
650 0 $aVoting.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418
650 0 $aComparative government.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029298
830 0 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84729581
852 00 $bleh$hJF1001$i.C69 1997
852 00 $bleh$hJF1001$i.C69 1997
852 00 $bmil$hJF1001$i.C69 1997