| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-004.mrc:606276278:3228 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
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LEADER: 03228mam a2200373 a 4500
001 1974470
005 20220609041754.0
008 960522t19971997paub b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96009159
020 $a0271016299 (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm34839619
035 $9AMJ0349CU
035 $a1974470
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dOrLoB-B
043 $an-us---$ae-yu---
050 00 $aE183.8.Y8$bL44 1997
082 00 $a327.730497$220
100 1 $aLees, Lorraine M.,$d1946-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n96051581
245 10 $aKeeping Tito afloat :$bthe United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War /$cLorraine M. Lees.
260 $aUniversity Park, Pa. :$bPennsylvania State University Press,$c[1997], ©1997.
300 $axviii, 246 pages :$b1 map ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $g1.$t1945-1947: The Most Loyal Satellite --$g2.$t1948-1949: "A Loyal and Cooperative Attitude" --$g3.$t1950-1952: A Question of Military Ties --$g4.$t1953-1955: The "Rollback" of Soviet Power --$g5.$t1955-1956: From Belgrade to Brioni to Moscow --$g6.$t1956-1957: "...Our Best Friend in the United States" --$tConclusion: 1958-1960: The Wedge Strategy Assessed.
520 $aKeeping Tito Afloat draws upon newly declassified documents to show the critical role that Yugoslavia played in U.S. foreign policy with the communist world in the early years of the Cold War. After World War II, the United States considered Yugoslavia to be a loyal Soviet satellite, but Tito surprised the West in 1948 by breaking with Stalin. Seizing this opportunity, the Truman administration sought to "keep Tito afloat" by giving him military and economic aid.
520 8 $aPresident Truman hoped that American involvement would encourage other satellites to follow Tito's example and further damage Soviet power. However, Lees demonstrates that it was President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who most actively tried to use Tito as a "wedge" to liberate the Eastern Europeans.
520 8 $aBy the end of 1958, Eisenhower and Dulles discontinued this "wedge strategy" because it raised too many questions about the ties that should exist between communist, noncommunist, and neutral states. As Tito shrewdly kept the United States at arm's length, Eisenhower was forced to accept Tito's continued absence from the Soviet orbit as victory enough. In the period between 1958 and 1960, Lees examines U.S. political objectives that remained after military support for Tito was discontinued.
520 8 $aAlthough use of Yugoslavia as a wedge never fully succeeded, Lees shows how that strategy reflected the pragmatic and geopolitical policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.
650 0 $aCold War.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh88005637
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zYugoslavia.
651 0 $aYugoslavia$xForeign relations$zUnited States.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008124436
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1989.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140098
852 00 $bglx$hE183.8.Y8$iL44 1997