Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:12611714:3168 |
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LEADER: 03168fam a2200409 a 4500
001 2008703
005 20220609050958.0
008 960812t19971997nju b 001 0 eng
010 $a 96040969
020 $a0691026300 (cl : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)35280772
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm35280772
035 $9AMN6389CU
035 $a(NNC)2008703
035 $a2008703
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC$dOrLoB-B
043 $an-us---
050 00 $aKF4552$b.S28 1997
082 00 $a347.73/2634$a347.3073534$220
100 1 $aScalia, Antonin.
245 12 $aA matter of interpretation :$bfederal courts and the law : an essay /$cby Antonin Scalia ; with commentary by Amy Gutmann, editor ... [et al.].
260 $aPrinceton, N.J. :$bPrinceton University Press,$c[1997], ©1997.
300 $axiii, 159 pages ;$c25 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aThe University Center for Human Values series
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 $aIn exploring the neglected art of statutory interpretation, Antonin Scalia urges that judges resist the temptation to use legislative intention and legislative history. In his view, it is incompatible with democratic government to allow the meaning of a statute to be determined by what the judges think the lawgivers meant rather than by what the legislature actually promulgated.
520 8 $aEschewing the judicial law-making that is the essence of common law, judges should interpret statutes and regulations by focusing on the text itself. Scalia then extends this principle to constitutional law. He proposes that we abandon the notion of an ever changing Constitution and pay attention to the Constitution's original meaning. Although not subscribing to the "strict constructionism" that would prevent applying the Constitution to modern circumstances, Scalia emphatically rejects the idea that judges can properly "smuggle" in new rights or deny old rights by using the Due Process Clause, for instance.
520 8 $aIn fact, such judicial discretion might lead to the destruction of the Bill of Rights if a majority of the judges ever wished to reach that most undesirable of goals.
520 8 $aThis essay is followed by four commentaries by Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin, who engage Justice Scalia's ideas about judicial interpretation, and the volume concludes with a response by Scalia. Dealing with one of the most fundamental issues in American law, A Matter of Interpretation reveals what is at the heart of this important debate.
650 0 $aConstitutional law$zUnited States.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139986
650 0 $aJudge-made law$zUnited States.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008122516
650 0 $aLaw$zUnited States$xInterpretation and construction.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008106844
700 1 $aGutmann, Amy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79147643
830 0 $aUniversity Center for Human Values series.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n96078453
852 00 $bbar$hKF4552$i.S28 1997