| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:205367256:1741 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:205367256:1741?format=raw |
LEADER: 01741fam a2200349 a 4500
001 2151490
005 20220615215129.0
008 970911s1998 nju b 001 0 eng
010 $a 97041419
020 $a069102684X (cloth : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)37640628
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm37640628
035 $9ANL4536CU
035 $a(NNC)2151490
035 $a2151490
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aHM131$b.Y64 1998
082 00 $a306$221
100 1 $aYoung, H. Peyton,$d1945-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81077296
245 10 $aIndividual strategy and social structure :$ban evolutionary theory of institutions /$cH. Peyton Young.
260 $aPrinceton, N.J. :$bPrinceton University Press,$c1998.
300 $axiii, 189 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $gCh. 1.$tOverview --$gCh. 2.$tLearning --$gCh. 3.$tDynamic and Stochastic Stability --$gCh. 4.$tAdaptive Learning in Small Games --$gCh. 5.$tVariations on the Learning Process --$gCh. 6.$tLocal Interaction --$gCh. 7.$tEquilibrium and Disequilibrium Selection in General Games --$gCh. 8.$tBargaining --$gCh. 9.$tContracts --$gCh. 10.$tConclusion --$gAppendix.$tProofs of Selected Theorems.
650 0 $aSocial institutions.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123963
650 0 $aInstitutional economics.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745
650 0 $aEvolutionary economics.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh92006044
650 0 $aGame theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941
852 00 $bleh$hHM131$i.Y64 1998
852 00 $boff,sci$hHM131$i.Y64 1998