| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-005.mrc:236426533:3616 |
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LEADER: 03616mam a2200361 a 4500
001 2181954
005 20220615223628.0
008 971112t19981998maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 97046390
020 $a0262194007 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm37955650
035 $9ANQ4765CU
035 $a2181954
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
043 $ad------
050 00 $aHC59.7$b.P5772 1998
082 00 $a338.9/009172/4$221
245 04 $aThe political economy of reform /$cedited by Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[1998], ©1998.
300 $avi, 380 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction /$rFederico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi --$gI.$tWhy? (The Positive Political Economy of Reforms) --$tInaction and Delay.$g2.$tThe Political Economy of Delayed Reform /$rAllan Drazen.$g3.$tResistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty /$rRaquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik.$g4.$tWhy Are Stabilizations Delayed? /$rAlberto Alesina and Allan Drazen.$g5.$tFiscal Conservatism as a Response to the Debt Crisis /$rRaul Laban and Federico Sturzenegger.$g6.$tThe Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms /$rAllan Drazen and Vittorio Grilli --$tDynamics.$g7.$tRecurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game /$rGuillermo Mondino, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi.$g8.$tThe Common Property Approach to the Political Economy of Fiscal Policy /$rAndres Velasco.$g9.$tFiscal Discipline in a Union /$rJoshua Aizenman.$g10.$tThe Rush to Free Trade in the Developing World: Why So Late? Why Now? Will It Last? /$rDani Rodrik --
505 80 $gII.$tHow? (Strategies for Reformers).$g11.$tThe Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty /$rMathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland.$g12.$tGradualism versus Big-Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms /$rShang-Jin Wei.$g13.$tSequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints /$rCesar Martinelli and Mariano Tommasi --$gIII.$tWho? (The Identity of Reformers).$g14.$tPromises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling /$rDani Rodrik.$g15.$tCredibility of Policymakers and of Economic Reforms /$rAlex Cukierman and Mariano Tommasi.$g16.$tThe Feasibility of Low Inflation: Theory with an Application to the Argentine Case /$rRicardo Lopez Murphy and Federico Sturzenegger.
520 $aIn this book, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi propose formal models to answer some of the questions raised by the recent reform experience of many Latin American and eastern European countries.
520 8 $aThe book is organized around three basic questions: first, why do reforms take place? Second, how are reforms implemented? And third, which candidates are most likely to undertake reform? Although most of the chapters deal with policy issues in developing economies, the findings also apply to areas such as social security and health care reform in industrialized countries.
651 0 $aDeveloping countries$xEconomic policy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102080
650 0 $aEconomic stabilization$zDeveloping countries.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102594
700 1 $aSturzenegger, Federico.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no92019623
700 1 $aTommasi, Mariano,$d1964-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n94054082
852 00 $boff,bus$hHC59.7$i.P5772 1998
852 00 $bleh$hHC59.7$i.P5772 1998