| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-006.mrc:257121736:2082 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-006.mrc:257121736:2082?format=raw |
LEADER: 02082fam a22003854a 4500
001 2724543
005 20221012232454.0
008 000301s2000 maub b 001 0 eng
010 $a 00028245
020 $a0262161958 (hc)
035 $a(OCoLC)43599167
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm43599167
035 $9ARH7510CU
035 $a(NNC)2724543
035 $a2724543
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dNNC$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aHD87$b.P468 2000
082 00 $a338.9$221
100 1 $aPersson, Torsten.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n81148181
245 10 $aPolitical economics :$bexplaining economic policy /$cTorsten Persson and Guido Tabellini.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c2000.
263 $a0011
300 $axix, 533 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aZeuthen lecture book series
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [489]-514) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tGeneral Introduction --$gI.$tTools of Political Economics.$g2.$tPreferences and Institutions.$g3.$tElectoral Competition.$g4.$tAgency.$g5.$tPartisan Politicians --$gII.$tRedistributive Politics.$g6.$tGeneral-Interest Politics.$g7.$tSpecial-Interest Politics --$gIII.$tComparative Politics.$g8.$tElectoral Rules and Electoral Competition.$g9.$tInstitutions and Accountability.$g10.$tPolitical Regimes --$gIV.$tDynamic Politics.$g11.$tDynamic Policy Problems.$g12.$tCapital Taxation.$g13.$tPublic Debt.$g14.$tGrowth --$gV.$tMonetary Politics.$g15.$tCredibility of Monetary Policy.$g16.$tElectoral Cycles.$g17.$tInstitutions and Incentives.$g18.$tInternational Policy Coordination.$g19.$tWhat Next?
650 0 $aEconomic policy.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040837
700 1 $aTabellini, Guido Enrico,$d1956-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n88633817
830 0 $aZeuthen lecture book series.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n97089107
852 00 $boff,bus$hHD87$i.P468 2000
852 00 $bleh$hHD87$i.P468 2000
852 00 $bmil,fli$hHD87$i.P468 2000