MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 05381mam a22004214a 4500
001 3405333
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008 020522t20032003mau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2002071759
015 $aGBA2-U5787
020 $a0262134179 (hc. : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm49892529
035 $9AVK3909CU
035 $a3405333
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dUKM$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aQP411$b.M485 2003
082 00 $a153$221
100 1 $aMetzinger, Thomas,$d1958-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n85339159
245 10 $aBeing no one :$bthe self-model theory of subjectivity /$cThomas Metzinger.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[2003], ©2003.
300 $axii, 699 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
500 $a"A Bradford book."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [635]-662) and indexes.
505 00 $g1.$tQuestions -- $g1.1.$tConsciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective -- $g1.2.$tQuestions -- $g1.3.$tOverview: The architecture of the book -- $g2.$tTools I -- $g2.1.$tOverview: Mental representation and phenomenal states -- $g2.2.$tFrom mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience -- $g2.3.$tFrom mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning -- $g2.4.$tFrom mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia -- $g2.5.$tPhenomenal presentation -- $g3.$tThe Representational Deep Structure of Phenomenal Experience -- $g3.1.$tWhat is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum? -- $g3.2.$tMultilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation? -- $g3.3.$tPhenomenal mental models -- $g4.$tNeurophenomenological Case Studies I -- $g4.1.$tReality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality --
505 80 $g4.2.$tDeviant phenomenal models of reality -- $g4.3.$tThe concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality -- $g5.$tTools II -- $g5.1.$tOverview: Mental self-representation and phenomenal self-consciousness -- $g5.2.$tFrom mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality -- $g5.3.$tFrom mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves -- $g5.4.$tFrom mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy -- $g6.$tThe Representational Deep Structure of the Phenomenal First-Person Perspective -- $g6.1.$tWhat is a phenomenal self-model? -- $g6.2.$tMultilevel constraints for self-consciousness: What turns a neural system-model into a phenomenal self? -- $g6.3.$tDescriptive levels of the human self-model -- $g6.4.$tLevels of content within the human self-model -- $g6.5.$tPerspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation -- $g6.6.$tThe self-model theory of subjectivity --
505 80 $g7.$tNeurophenomenological Case Studies II -- $g7.1.$tImpossible egos -- $g7.2.$tDeviant phenomenal models of the self -- $g7.3.$tThe concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective -- $g8.$tPreliminary Answers -- $g8.1.$tThe neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness -- $g8.2.$tPreliminary answers -- $g8.3.$tBeing no one.
520 1 $a"In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is.
520 8 $aBuilding a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description.
520 8 $aHe also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.".
520 8 $a"Metzinger introduces two theoretical entities - the "phenomenal self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" - that may form the decisive conceptual link between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
520 8 $aHe also discusses the roots of intersubjectivity, artificial subjectivity (the issue of nonbiological phenomenal selves), and connections between philosophy of mind and ethics."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aConsciousness.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235
650 0 $aCognitive neuroscience.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh91005166
650 0 $aSelf psychology.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh88002287
852 00 $boff,psy$hQP411$i.M485 2003