| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:266850435:3495 |
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001 4244709
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006 m o d
007 cr cn|||||||||
008 000112s1998 maua ob 001 0 eng d
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020 $a0585133786$q(electronic bk.)
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100 1 $aFudenberg, Drew.
245 14 $aThe theory of learning in games /$cDrew Fudenberg and David K. Levine.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c©1998.
300 $a1 online resource (xiv, 276 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
347 $atext file$bPDF$2rda
490 1 $aMIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ;$v2
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
505 0 $a1. Introduction -- 2. Fictitious Play -- 3. Replicator Dynamics and Related Deterministic Models of Evolution -- 4. Stochastic Fictitious Play and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria -- 5. Adjustment Models with Persistent Randomness -- 6. Extensive-Form Games and Self-confirming Equilibrium -- 7. Nash Equilibrium, Large Population Models, and Mutations in Extensive-Form Games -- 8. Sophisticated Learning.
520 $aIn economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 2 $aGame Theory
650 6 $aThéorie des jeux.
650 7 $aMATHEMATICS$xGame Theory.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aGame theory.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00937501
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aLevine, David K.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aFudenberg, Drew.$tTheory of learning in games.$dCambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©1998$z0262061945$w(DLC) 97039957$w(OCoLC)37579964
830 0 $aMIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ;$v2.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio4244709$zAll EBSCO eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS