| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:313653204:1970 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:313653204:1970?format=raw |
LEADER: 01970cam a2200361 a 4500
001 4273920
005 20221102193138.0
008 940216t19941994maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 94008308
015 $aGB94-88499
020 $a0262150417
020 $a0262650401 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm29952182
035 $a(NNC)4273920
035 $a4273920
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dUKM$dNLC$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aHB144$b.O733 1994
055 0 $aHB144$bO734 1994
082 00 $a658.4/0353$220
100 1 $aOsborne, Martin J.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n90603748
245 12 $aA course in game theory /$cMartin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[1994], ©1994.
300 $axv, 352 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [321]-339) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction --$gI.$tStrategic Games --$g2.$tNash Equilibrium --$g3.$tMixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium --$g4.$tRationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions --$g5.$tKnowledge and Equilibrium --$gII.$tExtensive Games with Perfect Information --$g6.$tExtensive Games with Perfect Information --$g7.$tBargaining Games --$g8.$tRepeated Games --$g9.$tComplexity Considerations in Repeated Games --$g10.$tImplementation Theory --$gIII.$tExtensive Games with Imperfect Information --$g11.$tExtensive Games with Imperfect Information --$g12.$tSequential Equilibrium --$gIV.$tCoalitional Games --$g13.$tThe Core --$g14.$tStable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value --$g15.$tThe Nash Solution.
650 0 $aGame theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941
653 0 $aGame theory
650 6 $aJeux, Théorie des.
700 1 $aRubinstein, Ariel.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n86819101
852 0 $bsci$hHB144$i.O733 1994
852 00 $boff,bus$hHB144$i.O733 1994