Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:394594092:3227 |
Source | marc_columbia |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-009.mrc:394594092:3227?format=raw |
LEADER: 03227cam a2200397 a 4500
001 4380708
005 20221102204617.0
008 030930s2004 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2003021660
020 $a0801442214 (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm53144730
035 $a(NNC)4380708
035 $a4380708
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
043 $ae-uk---$aa-ja---$an-us---
050 00 $aD511$b.T32 2004
082 00 $a327.1/09/04$222
100 1 $aTaliaferro, Jeffrey W.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no97083381
245 10 $aBalancing risks :$bgreat power intervention in the periphery /$cJeffrey W. Taliaferro.
260 $aIthaca, N.Y. :$bCornell University Press,$c2004.
300 $axviii, 304 pages ;$c25 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aCornell studies in security affairs
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [241]-296) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tPower politics and the balance of risk --$g2.$tExplaining great power involvement in the periphery --$g3.$tGermany and the 1905 Morocco crisis --$g4.$tJapan and the 1940-41 war decisions --$g5.$tThe United States and the Korean War (1950-51) --$g6.$tThe limits of great power intervention in the periphery --$g7.$tImplications of the argument.
520 1 $a"Why do powerful countries behave in a way that leads to entrapment in prolonged, expensive, and self-defeating conflicts?" "Jeffrey W. Taliaferro suggests that such interventions are driven by the refusal of senior officials to accept losses in their state's relative power, international status, or prestige. Instead of cutting their losses, leaders often continue to invest blood and money in failed excursions into the periphery. Their policies may seem to be driven by rational concerns about power and security, but Taliaferro deems them to be at odds with the master explanation of political realism." "He constructs a "balance-of-risk" theory of foreign policy that draws on defensive realism (in international relations) and prospect theory (in psychology). He illustrates the power of this new theory in several case narratives: Germany's initiation and escalation of the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan crises, the United States' involvement in the Korean War in 1950-52, and Japan's entanglement in the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937-40 and its decisions for war with the United States in 1940-41."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aWorld politics$y20th century.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85148221
651 0 $aGreat Britain$xForeign relations$y1901-1910.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85056713
651 0 $aJapan$xForeign relations$y1912-1945.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85069424
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1953.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140097
650 0 $aImperialism$xHistory$y20th century.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008104314
830 0 $aCornell studies in security affairs.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n83745343
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip049/2003021660.html
852 00 $bglx$hD511$i.T32 2004
852 00 $bbar$hD511$i.T32 2004