MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 02167cam a22003614a 4500
001 5257457
005 20221110002228.0
008 040521s2004 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2004051675
020 $a0333682394 (cloth)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm55534849
035 $a(NNC)5257457
035 $a5257457
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
042 $apcc
050 00 $aHB95$b.S84 2004
082 00 $a330.1$222
100 1 $aSugden, Robert.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n77018078
245 14 $aThe economics of rights, co-operation, and welfare /$cRobert Sugden.
250 $a2nd ed.
260 $aNew York :$bPalgrave Macmillan,$c2004.
300 $axiv, 243 pages :$billustrations ;$c23 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 234-238) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tSpontaneous order -- $g2.$tGames -- $g3.$tCoordination -- $g4.$tProperty -- $g5.$tPossession -- $g6.$tReciprocity -- $g7.$tFree riders -- $g8.$tNatural law -- $g9.$tRights, co-operation and welfare.
520 1 $a"In The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Robert Sugden sets out to answer a question that lies at the heart of economics and politics: how can individuals coordinate their behaviour in the absence of central law-enforcing agencies? Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, Sugden shows how self-enforcing conventions of property and reciprocity can evolve spontaneously out of the interactions of self-interested individuals. He goes on to argue that such conventions tend to become norms, even if they arbitrarily favour some people relative to others, and even if they do not maximize social welfare."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aFree enterprise.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85073989
650 0 $aLiberty.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85076480
650 0 $aProperty.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85107496
650 0 $aWelfare economics.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85146027
650 0 $aSocial choice.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85123920
852 00 $boff,bus$hHB95$i.S84 2004