MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 03405pam a2200325 a 4500
001 5469288
005 20221110042752.0
008 041122t20052005maua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2004062535
020 $a0262182475 (alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm57193332
035 $a(NNC)5469288
035 $a5469288
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dBAKER$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aB105.M55$bR63 2005
082 00 $a128/.2$222
100 1 $aRockwell, W. Teed.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2004106808
245 10 $aNeither brain nor ghost :$ba nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity theory /$cW. Teed Rockwell.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[2005], ©2005.
300 $axxii, 231 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
500 $a"A Bradford book."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [219]-226) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tMinds, brains, and behavior -- $g2.$tBeyond the cranium -- $g3.$tBeyond the neuronal mind -- $g4.$tCausation and embodiment -- $g5.$tThe myth of the autonomous mind-brain -- $g6.$tExperience, sense data, and language : putting experience back into the environment -- $g7.$tThe return of the zombies -- $g8.$tThe "frame problem" and the "background" -- $g9.$tDreams, illusions, and errors -- $g10.$tDewey and the dynamic alternative.
520 1 $a"Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory - which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" (distinct from Daniel Dennett's concept of the same name) - and accept this new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems." "Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory (DST)."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aMind-brain identity theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491
650 0 $aMind and body.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488
650 0 $aPragmatism.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85106059
852 00 $boff,glx$hB105.M55$iR63 2005