| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-013.mrc:263541720:3410 |
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LEADER: 03410pam a22004214a 4500
001 6310495
005 20221122021650.0
008 070104t20082008mau b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2007000278
015 $aGBA753208$2bnb
016 7 $a013789113$2Uk
020 $a9780262026239 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 $a0262026236 (hardcover : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)OCM77766991
035 $a(OCoLC)77766991
035 $a(NNC)6310495
035 $a6310495
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dBTCTA$dBAKER$dUKM$dC#P$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aB835$b.B865 2008
082 00 $a128/.2$222
100 1 $aBuechner, Jeff.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2007000791
245 10 $aGödel, Putnam, and functionalism :$ba new reading of Representation and reality /$cJeff Buechner.
260 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bMIT Press,$c[2008], ©2008.
300 $ax, 344 pages ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
500 $a"A Bradford book."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [305]-336) and index.
505 00 $tIntroduction -- $g1.$tPutnam's Use of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems to Refute Computational Functionalism -- $g2.$tPutnam's Bombshell : The Godelian Argument in "Reflexive Reflections" -- $g3.$tUniversal Realization of Computation : Putnam's Triviality Argument -- $g4.$tPutnam's Triviality Theorem and Universal Physical Computation -- $g5.$tSearle on Triviality and the Subjective Nature of Computation -- $g6.$tThere Are Infinitely Many Computational Realizations of an Arbitrary Intentional State -- $g7.$tAgainst Local Computational Reduction : The EQUIVALENCE Argument -- $g8.$tRational Interpretation, Synonymy Determination, and EQUIVALENCE -- $g9.$tThe Question of the Nonformalizability of SD, Coreferentiality Decisions, and the Family of Notions : Rational Interpretation[subscript 1], General Intelligence, and Reasonable Reasoning.
520 1 $a"In the late 1950s, with mind-brain identity theories no longer dominant in philosophy of mind, scientific materialists turned to functionalism, the view that the identity of any mental state depends on its function in the cognitive system of which it is a part. The philosopher Hilary Putnam was one of the primary architects of functionalism and was the first to propose computational functionalism, which views the human mind as a computer or an information processor. But in the early 1970s Putnam began to have doubts about functionalism, and in his masterwork Representation and Reality, he advanced four powerful arguments against his own doctrine of computational functionalism. In Godel, Putnam, and Functionalism, Jeff Buechner systematically examines Putnam's arguments against functionalism and contends that they are unsuccessful."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aRealism.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85111767
600 10 $aGödel, Kurt.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79007770
600 10 $aPutnam, Hilary.$tRepresentation and reality.
650 0 $aFunctionalism (Psychology)$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052323
650 0 $aMind-brain identity theory.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491
650 0 $aComputers.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85029552
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip078/2007000278.html
852 00 $boff,glx$hB835$i.B865 2008