| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-014.mrc:54748376:3668 |
| Source | marc_columbia |
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LEADER: 03668cam a22004214a 4500
001 6762709
005 20221122045921.0
008 070627s2008 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2007026982
020 $a9780521881029 (hbk.)
020 $a0521881021 (hbk.)
020 $a9780521707404 (pbk.)
020 $a0521707404 (pbk.)
024 $a40015384547
035 $a(OCoLC)152560075
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn152560075
035 $a(NNC)6762709
035 $a6762709
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dBAKER$dBTCTA$dYDXCP$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aJF1001$b.D825 2008
082 00 $a324.9$222
100 1 $aDuch, Raymond M.,$d1953-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91008496
245 14 $aThe economic vote :$bhow political and economic institutions condition election results /$cRaymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson.
260 $aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2008.
300 $axiii, 399 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 373-390) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tIntroduction -- $gPt. I.$tDescribing the Economic Vote in Western Democracies -- $g2.$tDefining and Measuring the Economic Vote -- $g3.$tPatterns of Retrospective Economic Voting in Western Democracies -- $g4.$tEstimation, Measurement, and Specification -- $gPt. II.$tA Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals -- $g5.$tCompetency Signals and Rational Retrospective Economic Voting -- $g6.$tWhat Do Voters Know about Economic Variation and Its Sources? -- $g7.$tPolitical Control of the Economy -- $gPt. III.$tA Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting -- $g8.$tResponsibility, Contention, and the Economic Vote -- $g9.$tThe Distribution of Responsibility and the Economic Vote -- $g10.$tThe Pattern of Contention and the Economic Vote -- $gPt. IV.$tConclusion and Summary -- $g11.$tConclusion.
520 1 $a"This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition their economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts, and then test explanations for this variation derived from their theory. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aVoting$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aElections$xEconomic aspects.
700 1 $aStevenson, Randolph T.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2007045568
830 0 $aPolitical economy of institutions and decisions.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84729581
856 42 $3Publisher description$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0803/2007026982-d.html
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0803/2007026982-t.html
852 00 $bleh$hJF1001$i.D825 2008