It looks like you're offline.
Open Library logo
additional options menu

MARC Record from marc_columbia

Record ID marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-014.mrc:77450630:5355
Source marc_columbia
Download Link /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-014.mrc:77450630:5355?format=raw

LEADER: 05355cam a2200349 a 4500
001 6855586
005 20221122053502.0
008 080321t20082008njua be 001 0 eng
010 $a 2008011663
020 $a9781412807623 (alk. paper)
020 $a141280762X (alk. paper)
024 $a40015637526
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn185032309
035 $a(OCoLC)185032309
035 $a(NNC)6855586
035 $a6855586
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dBTCTA$dBAKER$dYDXCP$dC#P$dUKM$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aJZ5665$b.L37 2008
082 00 $a327.1/74703$222
100 1 $aLarkin, Bruce D.,$d1936-$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87930173
245 10 $aDesigning denuclearization :$ban interpretive encyclopedia /$cBruce D. Larkin.
260 $aNew Brunswick, N.J. :$bTransaction Publishers,$c[2008], ©2008.
300 $axviii, 430 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 413-416) and index.
505 00 $g1.$tThe transition problem -- $g2.$tThe concealed retained weapons problem -- $g3.$tThe concealed clandestine program problem -- $g4.$tThe problem posed by dissimilar non-nuclear capabilities -- $g5.$tThe problem of retained capacity for reconstitution -- $g6.$tThe problem of ongoing design -- $g7.$tThe problem of compensatory non-nuclear arming -- $g8.$tThe problem of joint simultaneous decision -- $g9.$tThe problem of regime enforcement -- $g10.$tThe problem that ZNW today would enhance the relative power of the conventionally powerful -- $g11.$tThe objection that conventional war will become more probably -- $g12.$tThe objection that nuclear devices serve missions other than nuclear deterrence -- $g13.$tThe objection that an advantage is being surrendered -- $g14.$tThe obstacle of patrio-opportunism -- $g15.$tThe obstacle of perceived interest -- $g16.$tThe objection that - given uncertainties - only self-reliance assures security -- $g17.$tThe objection that a nuclear abolition regime will prove unenforceable -- $g18.$tThe objection that nuclear weapons can be safely retained and prudently managed -- $g19.$tThe objection that ZNW is unrealistic -- $g20.$tThe Manhattan Project scientists and proposals for international control -- $g21.$tThe Acheson-Lilienthal report (16 March 1946) -- $g22.$tThe United Nations Atomic Energy Commission -- $g23.$tThe Eisenhower administration -- $g24.$tThe Kennedy administration : U.S., Russian, and Chinese proposals of 1961-1963 -- $g25.$tZones -- $g26.$tThe Gorbachev initiative of 15 January 1986 -- $g27.$tReykjavik -- $g28.$tThe Canberra Commission report (14 August 1996) -- $g29.$tModel Nuclear Weapons Convention -- $g30.$tThe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT review conferences, and the New Agenda Coalition -- $g31.$tLandmark post-Cold War declarations, commentaries, and advocacy initiatives -- $g32.$tThe Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission -- $g33.$tNuclear Security project -- $g34.$tWarhead and fissile material accounting -- $g35.$tVerification -- $g36.$tWhistle-blowing and "societal verification" -- $g37.$tSystematic and open modeling -- $g38.$tSimultaneous move to zero -- $g39.$tTransparence -- $g40.$tReview and dispute resolution procedures -- $g41.$tGovernmental and intergovernmental research units -- $g42.$tNon-state research centers -- $g43.$tDesigning negotiability -- $g44.$tFocused talks -- $g45.$tNine tests -- $g46.$t"Collaborative governance" vs. "sovereign unilateralism" -- $g47.$tActive reassurance -- $g48.$tConventional force limits -- $g49.$tCollective security -- $g50.$tDetargeting -- $g51.$tDealerting -- $g52.$tHEU control and buydown -- $g53.$tIndia and Pakistan : non-weaponization and non-deployment -- $g54.$t"No first use" or "only for deterrence"? -- $g55.$tProjects on denuclearization design -- $g56.$tEmpirical examples of denuclearization design -- $g57.$tPaths as I see them.
520 1 $a"This work canvasses nuclear weapon abolition, proposals placed on the table since 1945 and the obstacles and issues which a realistic program for abolition confronts today. It has an ambitious purpose, to show that nuclear abolition can and should be placed on the public agenda. The author terms it "interpretive" in that it incorporates his commentaries, never hiding his reasons and judgments. It is neither "just the facts" nor "all the facts." It is an encyclopedia in the original meaning of "a general course of instruction." He identifies himself with all who pursue the problem posed by nuclear weapons systematically and with seriousness of purpose, committed to self-instruction. In another sense, he writes, this work is a conversation with the Reader." "Larkin's text is written for those, whether practitioners or citizens, interested in designing and bringing about denuclearization. Abolition cannot be achieved by political elites in the absence of broad concurrent public support. Governments, career policy officials and legislators have chosen to assume responsibility for the public agenda. They may be asked - must be asked - what they will do to bring about denuclearization."--BOOK JACKET.
650 0 $aNuclear disarmament$vEncyclopedias.
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation$vEncyclopedias.
650 0 $aInternational organization$vEncyclopedias.
852 00 $bleh$hJZ5665$i.L37 2008