MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 04145cam a22003614a 4500
001 7389824
005 20091222085804.0
008 060925s2007 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2006051691
020 $a9780521862745 (hardback)
020 $a0521862744 (hardback)
024 $a99934780109
035 $a(OCoLC)71810168
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm71810168\
035 $a(NNC)7389824
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dYDX$dBAKER$dBTCTA$dYDXCP$dBWK$dOrLoB-B
050 00 $aB415$b.P64 2007
082 00 $a128$222
100 1 $aPolansky, Ronald M.,$d1948-
245 10 $aAristotle's De anima /$cRonald Polansky.
260 $aNew York :$bCambridge University Press,$c2007.
300 $axvi, 580 p. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 555-562) and index.
505 00 $tCommentary on De Anima -- $tBook 1 -- $g1.$tThe Nobility and Difficulty of Study of Soul; Its Connection with Body -- $g2.$tThe Predecessors' Use of Soul to Account for Motion and Perception -- $g3.$tCriticism of Predecessors' Way of Accounting for Motion -- $g4.$tCriticism of the Harmonia View as an Account of Motion -- $g5.$tCriticism of Predecessors' Way of Accounting for Cognition -- $tBook 2 -- $g1.$tDefinition of Soul -- $g2.$tWhat Is Life? -- $g3.$tHow Powers of Soul Are Distributed and United in the Soul -- $g4.$tThe Nutritive Faculty: Its Object and Subfaculties -- $g5.$tClarification of Being Affected, Living as Saving, and the First Definition of Sense -- $g6.$tThe Three Sorts of Sensible Objects -- $g7.$tVision, Medium, and Object -- $g8.$tHearing, Sound, and Voice -- $g9.$tSmell and Odor -- $g10.$tTaste Is a Contact Sense; the Tasteable -- $g11.$tTouch, the Tangibles, and Sense as a Mean -- $g12.$tDefinition of Sense and Whether Sensibles Affect Nonperceiving Bodies -- $tBook 3 -- $g1.$tIn the World As It Is There Can Be but the Five Senses -- $g2.$tWhat Allows for Perceiving That We Perceive; Sense Joins in a Common Power so That the Five Senses Are Subfaculties of a Central Sense Faculty -- $g3.$tDistinguishing Sense and Thought; What Is Phantasia? -- $g4.$tWhat Is Mind as That Capable of Thinking All Things -- $g5.$tWhat Enables Thinking to Occur -- $g6.$tThe Sorts of Intelligible Objects -- $g7.$tPhantasia Has a Role in All Thinking -- $g8.$tThat Mind Can Think All Things -- $g9.$tThere Is a Capacity for Progressive Motion -- $g10.$tThe Desiderative Capacity Is the Primary Cause of Progressive Motion -- $g11.$tEven the Simplest Animals Have Indefinite Phantasia, and Calculative Phantasia Fits the Account of Progressive Motion -- $g12.$tThe Necessary Order of the Faculties of Soul -- $g13.$tThe Sort of Body Requisite to Support the Order of the Faculties of Soul.
520 1 $a"Aristotle's De anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previously supposed. He contends that Aristotle seeks a comprehensive understanding of the soul and its faculties. By closely tracing the unfolding of the many-layered argumentation and the way Aristotle fits his inquiry meticulously within his scheme of the sciences, Polansky answers questions relating to the general definition of soul and the treatment of each of the soul's principal capacities: nutrition, sense perception, phantasia, intellect, and locomotion. The commentary sheds new light on every section of the De anima and the work as a unit. It offers a challenge to earlier and current interpretations of the relevance and meaning of Aristotle's highly influential treatise."--BOOK JACKET.
600 00 $aAristotle.$tDe anima.
650 0 $aPsychology.
650 0 $aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 $aSoul.
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2006051691-t.html
856 42 $3Publisher description$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2006051691-d.html
856 42 $3Contributor biographical information$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0729/2006051691-b.html
852 00 $bglx$hB415$i.P64 2007