MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 06827cam a2200577 a 4500
001 8040851
005 20221201052754.0
008 100907s2010 pau b f000 0 eng c
020 $a9781584874560
020 $a1584874562
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn659557667
035 $a(NNC)8040851
035 $a8040851
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dAWC$dGPO$dAFQ
042 $apcc
043 $aa-cc---
050 4 $aHD9502.C6$bC53 2010
100 1 $aClarke, Ryan.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2010053753
245 10 $aChinese energy security :$bthe myth of the PLAN's frontline status /$cRyan Clarke.
246 3 $aMyth of the People's Liberation Army Navy's frontline status
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2010]
300 $avii, 113 pages ;$c23 cm.
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
490 1 $aLetort papers ;$v[no. 40]
500 $a"August 2010."
520 $a"This monograph examines the dynamics of China's energy security dilemma and the role of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Following this, PLAN development is discussed and its future role in regional security is hypothesized. This report argues that it is domestic market inefficiencies and poor management practices that pose the greatest threat to China's energy security. Further, less and less of Chinese energy imports are making their way to the country by sea; thus the PLAN actually has a minimal role to play. Given these realities, Chinese fears of a naval blockade that deprives it of energy supplies, as well as American confidence that this is a realistic strategic option in the event of hostilities are implausible. In addition, Beijing's desire to develop aircraft carriers and other high-tech naval capabilities combined with its contribution to the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden have led many analysts to erroneously conclude that China seeks to engage in global power projection like the United States. However, the focus of the PLAN will remain regional and on asymmetric capabilities, namely the effective use of submarines and other undersea devices that ultimately seek to deter American and possible Japanese involvement in a conflict over Taiwan and/or in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which China views as inalienable parts of its territory. Although China's interests are expanding and becoming more international in nature, recovering from the century of humiliation and ensuring domestic legitimacy remain the top priorities of China's leadership."--P. vii.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 97-113).
505 0 $aThe dynamics of China's energy security dilemma -- Market inefficiencies : China's primary threat -- Key sources of supply -- How vulnerable is China to a naval blockade? -- A more realistic assessment of the PLAN's future roles -- Chinese views on maritime security -- Recent PLAN developments -- PLAN enters Somalia : the beginning of a new chapter? -- Taiwan : PLAN's most likely conflict theater? -- PRC policy and strategy towards Taiwan -- Taiwan policy and strategy towards PRC -- U.S. policy and strategy -- Can the PRC invade Taiwan? -- Invasion scenario -- U.S. military involvement : the X factor -- The simmering Spratly Islands dispute -- Why the Spratlys? : causes of the dispute -- The sovereignty issue : an obstacle to dispute settlement -- Consequences of conflict -- Sino-Japanese tension in the East China Sea -- Key findings.
520 $a"This monograph examines the dynamics of China's energy security dilemma and the role of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Following this, PLAN development is discussed, and its future role in regional security is hypothesized. This report argues that it is domestic market inefficiencies and poor management practices that pose the greatest threat to China's energy security. Further, less and less of Chinese energy imports are making their way to the country by sea; thus the PLAN actually has a minimal role to play. Given these realities, Chinese fears of a naval blockade that deprives it of energy supplies as well as American confidence that this is a realistic strategic option in the event of hostilities are implausible. In addition, Beijing's desire to develop aircraft carriers and other high-tech naval capabilities combined with its contribution to the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden have led many analysts to erroneously conclude that China seeks to engage in global power projection like the United States. However, the focus of the PLAN will remain regional and on asymmetric capabilities, namely, the effective use of submarines and other undersea devices that ultimately seek to deter American and possible Japanese involvement in a conflict over Taiwan and/or in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which China views as inalienable parts of its territory. Although China's interests are expanding and becoming more international in nature, recovering from the century of humiliation and ensuring domestic legitimacy remain the top priorities of China's leadership."--P. vii.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
610 10 $aChina.$bZhongguo ren min jie fang jun.$bHai jun$xOrganization.
610 10 $aChina.$bZhongguo ren min jie fang jun.$bHai jun$xOperational readiness.
650 0 $aEnergy policy$zChina.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008103053
650 0 $aPetroleum industry and trade$zChina.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008109125
650 0 $aSea-power$zChina.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2010112358
650 0 $aSea control.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85119213
650 0 $aNational security$zChina.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008108225
651 0 $aChina$xDependency on foreign countries.
651 0 $aTaiwan$xStrategic aspects.
651 0 $aSpratly Islands$xStrategic aspects.
651 0 $aSpratly Islands$xInternational status.
651 0 $aSouth China Sea$xStrategic aspects.
651 0 $aChina$xMilitary policy$y21st century.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n80120847
776 08 $iOnline version:$aClarke, Ryan.$tChinese energy security.$h1 online resource (vii, 113 p.)$z1584874562$w(OCoLC)662512634
830 0 $aLetort papers ;$vno. 40.$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no97064748
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1012.pdf
856 40 $uhttp://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS125965
856 4 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1012.pdf
852 00 $bleh$hHD9502.C6$iC53 2010g