MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 05283cam a2200445 a 4500
001 8658736
005 20120419191354.0
008 110513s2011 pau b f000 0 eng c
020 $a9781584874881 (pbk.)
020 $a1584874880 (pbk.)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn723123516
035 $a(OCoLC)723123516
035 $a(NNC)8658736
040 $aAWC$cAWC$dAFQ
042 $apcc
050 4 $aHV6640$b.S65 2011
100 1 $aSmith, Andrew.
245 10 $aImprovised explosive devices in Iraq, 2003-09 :$ba case of operational surprise and institutional response /$cAndrew Smith.
260 $aCarlisle, PA :$bStrategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,$c[2011]
300 $aviii, 73 p. :$bill. ;$c23 cm.
490 1 $aLetort papers ;$v[no. 47]
500 $a"April 2011."
520 $aThe threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational - if not strategic - implications. Those implications can necessitate "institutional" responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are "wars of discretion." Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptation considered by John Nagl. This paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response. A case study of this experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. This case study reveals that institutional response is triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding, budgetary, and policy actions.
530 $aAlso available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
520 $a"The threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that has emerged in conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 is a contemporary example of conventional militaries being confronted with a tactical surprise with operational - if not strategic - implications. Those implications can necessitate "institutional" responses to avoid strategic defeat in what, for many countries, are "wars of discretion." Operational surprise, as defined in this examination, differs from strategic shocks as described by Nathan Freier, and the necessary responses are distinct from the military adaptation considered by John Nagl. This paper contends that the 6-year evolution of the IED experience from 2003 until 2009 constitutes a complete cycle of surprise and response, of which the most significant part is the institutional response. A case study of this experience illustrates how conventional military establishments recognize and respond to such surprises, with a particular focus on the experience, respectively, of the U.S. and Australian defense establishments. This case study reveals that institutional response is triggered by recognition of the surprise, which then cues organizational, equipment, training and doctrine, research and development, industrial, funding, budgetary, and policy actions."--P. vii.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 50-73).
505 0 $aSummary -- Introduction -- Operational surprise and response -- The contemporary IED experience -- Data sources -- U.S. experience in Iraq -- The U.S. response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Vehicles -- Electronic countermeasures -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Summary assessment -- The Australian experience in Iraq -- The Australian response -- Recognition -- Institutional response -- Organizational -- Equipment -- Training and doctrine -- Research and development -- Industrial -- Funding -- Policy -- Comparative analysis of responses -- Leadership changes -- National interests and equities -- Adequacy of existing capabilities -- Countervailing assessments -- Conventional thinking -- Adequate agility -- Flexible force structure -- Other considerations -- Failure to anticipate and the risk of overreaction -- The focusing power of casualties -- Subsequent experience - Afghanistan -- Conclusions.
610 10 $aUnited States.$bArmy$xSecurity measures.
610 10 $aAustralia.$bAustralian Army$xSecurity measures.
650 0 $aImprovised explosive devices$zIraq.
650 0 $aMines (Military explosives)$zIraq.
650 0 $aExplosives, Military.
650 0 $aSoldiers$xProtection$zIraq.
650 0 $aAmbushes and surprises.
650 0 $aTactics.
650 0 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xCasualties.
710 2 $aArmy War College (U.S.).$bStrategic Studies Institute.
830 0 $aLetort papers ;$vno. 47.
856 41 $uhttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1064.pdf
852 00 $bleh$hHV6640$i.S65 2011g