| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-024.mrc:24306075:3866 |
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LEADER: 03866cam a2200565 i 4500
001 11548010
005 20151019134543.0
008 130311s2013 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2013007954
019 $a861666281
020 $a9781107042209 (hardback)
020 $a1107042208 (hardback)
020 $a9781107660397 (pbk.)
020 $a1107660394 (pbk.)
024 $a99963990173
024 8 $a40022810456
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn829999688
035 $a(OCoLC)829999688$z(OCoLC)861666281
035 $a(NNC)11548010
040 $aDLC$beng$erda$cDLC$dYDXCP$dORC$dNGU$dMUU$dYUS$dMNU$dCHVBK$dALM$dORZ
042 $apcc
050 00 $aJF1525.P6$bS76 2013
082 00 $a324$223
100 1 $aStokes, Susan Carol.
245 10 $aBrokers, voters, and clientelism :$bthe puzzle of distributive politics /$cSusan C. Stokes, Yale University, Thad Dunning, Yale University, Marcelo Nazareno, National University of Córdoba, Argentina, Valeria Brusco, National University of Córdoba, Argentina.
264 1 $aNew York, N.Y. :$bCambridge University Press,$c2013.
300 $axx, 316 pages :$billustrations ;$c24 cm.
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 299-310) and index.
505 8 $aPart I. Modalities of Distributive Politics: 1. Between clients and citizens: puzzles and concepts in the study of distributive politics; Part II. The Micro-Logic of Clientelism: 2. Gaps between theory and fact; 3. A theory of broker-mediated distribution; 4. Testing the theory of broker-mediated distribution; 5. A disjunction between the strategies of leaders and brokers?; 6. Clientelism and poverty; Part III. The Macro-Logic of Vote-Buying: What Explains the Rise and Decline of Political Machines?: 7. Party leaders against the machine; Part IV. Clientelism and Democratic Theory: 8. What's wrong with buying votes?
520 0 $aBrokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable, and illegal, to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation. -- Publisher website.
650 0 $aPolitical planning$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aPolitics, Practical$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aPolitical science$xEconomic aspects.
650 0 $aFinance, Public$xPolitical aspects.
650 0 $aEconomic policy.
650 0 $aPolitical ethics.
650 7 $aDemokratie.$0(DE-588)4011413-2$2gnd
650 7 $aWahl.$0(DE-588)4064286-0$2gnd
650 7 $aKlientelismus.$0(DE-588)4323377-6$2gnd
650 7 $aVerteilungspolitik.$0(DE-588)4188065-1$2gnd
650 7 $aWahlverhalten.$0(DE-588)4079009-5$2gnd
650 7 $aManipulation.$0(DE-588)4037348-4$2gnd
650 7 $aBroker.$0(DE-588)4134688-9$2gnd
650 7 $aInternationaler Vergleich.$0(DE-588)4120509-1$2gnd
830 0 $aCambridge studies in comparative politics.
852 00 $bleh$hJF1525.P6$iS76 2013