| Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-026.mrc:96157650:3692 |
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LEADER: 03692cam a2200565 i 4500
001 12869457
005 20171120154334.0
008 130123t20132013enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2012050827
015 $aGBB2A4886$2bnb
016 7 $a016191224$2Uk
019 $a844455921$a847239067
020 $a9781107005488$q(hardback)
020 $a1107005485$q(hardback)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn813858402
035 $a(OCoLC)813858402$z(OCoLC)844455921$z(OCoLC)847239067
035 $a(NNC)12869457
040 $aDLC$beng$erda$cDLC$dYDX$dUKMGB$dBTCTA$dOCLCO$dYDXCP$dCDX$dYNK$dPUL$dMUU$dIG#$dSTF$dOCLCF$dZWZ$dGBVCP$dOSU$dOCLCA$dMYUKM$dLSD$dDKC$dUV1$dOCLCQ$dLIP
041 1 $aeng$hheb
042 $apcc
050 00 $aQA269$b.Z3613 2013
082 00 $a519.3$223
084 $aBUS069000$2bisacsh
084 $a519.3$bMAS
100 1 $aZamir, Shmuel,$eauthor.
240 10 $aTorat ha-miśḥaḳim.$lEnglish
245 10 $aGame theory /$cMichael Maschler, Eilon Solan, Shmuel Zamir ; translated from Hebrew by Ziv Hellman ; English editor, Mike Borns.
264 1 $aCambridge, Great Britain :$bCambridge University Press,$c2013.
264 4 $c©2013
300 $axxvi, 979 pages :$billustrations ;$c26 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
546 $aTranslated from Hebrew.
500 $aTranslation of: Torat ha-miśḥaḳim / Shemuʼel Zamir, Mikhaʼel Mashler ṿe-Elon Solan.
520 $a"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--$cProvided by publisher.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 958-967) and index.
505 0 $aAcknowledgments -- Notations -- Introduction -- 1. The game of chess -- 2. Utility theory -- 3. Extensive-form games -- 4. Strategic-form games -- 5. Mixed strategies -- 6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem -- 7. Equilibrium refinements -- 8. Correlated equilibria -- 9. Games with incomplete information and common priors -- 10. Games with incomplete information: the general model -- 11. The universal belief space -- 12. Auctions -- 13. Repeated games -- 14. Repeated games with vector payoffs -- 15. Bargaining games --16. Coalitional games with transferable utility -- 17. The core -- 18. The Shapley value -- 19. The bargaining set -- 20. The nucleolus -- 21. Social choice -- 22. Stable matching -- 23. Appendices -- Index.
650 0 $aGame theory.
650 7 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS$xEconomics$xGeneral.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aGame theory.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00937501
650 7 $aThéorie des jeux.$2ram
650 7 $0(DE-601)106155296$0(DE-588)4056243-8$aSpieltheorie$2stw
650 7 $aSpieltheorie$0(DE-601)091390885$0(DE-STW)15458-6$2stw
700 1 $aMaschler, Michael,$d1927-2008,$eauthor.
700 1 $aSolan, Eilon,$eauthor.
700 1 $aHellman, Ziv,$etranslator.
700 1 $aBorns, Mike,$eeditor.
856 42 $3Cover image$uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/05488/cover/9781107005488.jpg
852 00 $bleh$hQA269$i.Z3613 2013