Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-030.mrc:118033800:5578 |
Source | marc_columbia |
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LEADER: 05578cam a2200745Mi 4500
001 14751800
005 20220521232549.0
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 190109s2019 enk o 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)on1089410292
035 $a(NNC)14751800
040 $aU3W$beng$epn$cU3W$dOCLCO$dOCLCF$dYDX$dEBLCP$dTYFRS$dOCLCQ$dOCLCA$dUKAHL$dOCLCQ$dN$T$dSFB$dOCLCO
020 $a9780367197056$q(pbk.)
020 $a0367197057
020 $a9780367823740$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a0367823748$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a9781000733518$q(electronic bk. ;$qEPUB)
020 $a1000733513$q(electronic bk. ;$qEPUB)
020 $a9781000733136$q(electronic bk. ;$qPDF)
020 $a1000733130$q(electronic bk. ;$qPDF)
020 $a9781000733327$q(electronic bk. ;$qMobipocket)
020 $a1000733327$q(electronic bk. ;$qMobipocket)
035 $a(OCoLC)1089410292
037 $a9780367823740$bTaylor & Francis
043 $aa-ir---$an-us---
050 4 $aJZ5675
055 8 $aJZ5675
072 7 $aPOL$x011000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aPOL$x001000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aPOL$x059000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aGTJ$2bicssc
082 04 $a327.17470955$223
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aFitzpatrick, Mark$c(Senior fellow for non-proliferation),$eauthor.
245 10 $aUncertain future :$bthe JCPOA and Iran's nuclear and missile programmes /$cMark Fitzpatrick, Michael Elleman and Paulina Izewicz.
264 1 $aLondon :$bRoutledge,$c2019.
300 $a1 online resource (164 pages)
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aAdelphi (Series) ;$v466-467
505 0 $a1. Assessing the JCPOA -- 2. The JCPOA Procurement Channel -- 3. Evaluating design intent in Iran's ballistic-missile programme.
520 $aIn July 2015, eight parties - France, Germany and the United Kingdom, together with the European Union and China, Russia and the United States on the one side, and Iran on the other - adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran nuclear deal. Under the agreement, Iran accepted limits to its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief. Hailed by some as a diplomatic achievement, detractors - both in the US and the Middle East - saw the deal as overly lenient. In May 2018, US President Donald Trump announced that the US would cease waiving sanctions and withdraw from the agreement. This Adelphi book assesses that Trump's decision was a grave error. Like any multilateral agreement, the deal was not perfect, but Iran had been honouring its commitments. Drawing on a deep understanding of the non-proliferation regime and technical expertise, the authors trace the emergence of antipathy to the JCPOA and set out how many of the politicised criticisms of the accord are demonstrably incorrect. They argue that the little-known Procurement Channel - established by the JCPOA to give Iran a legitimate route to procure goods and services for its now-limited nuclear programme - has been an effective check on Iran's illicit procurement of nuclear-related goods. Moreover, this book demonstrates that Iran's nuclear and ballistic-missile programmes are not intrinsically linked, as not all Iranian missiles are designed to be nuclear-capable. While the deal endures for now, its survival will ultimately depend on Iran.
545 0 $aMark Fitzpatrick is an associate fellow at the IISS. Until the end of 2018, he was Executive Director of IISS-Americas and director of the Institute's Non-proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme. Prior to joining IISS in 2005, he was a career US Foreign Service Officer. Michael Elleman is Senior Fellow for Missile Defence at the IISS and the principal author of the IISS Strategic DossierIran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment. He previously worked as a missile expert for weapons inspection missions in Iraq and spent two decades as a scientist at Lockheed Martin. Paulina Izewicz is a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Until spring 2018, she managed programmatic work on sanctions and led a Track 1.5 dialogue with Iran for the IISS.
630 00 $aJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action$d(2015 July 14)
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation$zIran.
650 0 $aNuclear nonproliferation$xInternational cooperation.
651 0 $aIran$xForeign relations$zUnited States.
651 0 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zIran.
650 6 $aNon-prolifération nucléaire$zIran.
650 6 $aNon-prolifération nucléaire$xCoopération internationale.
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xInternational Relations$xGeneral.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xInternational Relations$xArms Control.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aDiplomatic relations.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01907412
650 7 $aNuclear nonproliferation.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01040376
650 7 $aNuclear nonproliferation$xInternational cooperation.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01040380
651 7 $aIran.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01204889
651 7 $aUnited States.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01204155
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aElleman, Michael,$eauthor.
700 1 $aIzewicz, Paulina,$eauthor.
830 0 $aAdelphi (Series) (International Institute for Strategic Studies) ;$v466-467.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14751800$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS