MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 05556cam a2200541 i 4500
001 14934017
005 20221111172438.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 200106s2020 nyua ob 001 0 eng
010 $a 2019055826
035 $a(OCoLC)on1150866818
035 $a(NNC)14934017
040 $aDLC$beng$erda$cDLC$dOCLCO$dOCLCQ$dOCLCF$dEBLCP$dYDX$dN$T$dUBY$dUKOUP$dTEFOD
020 $a0197509622$qelectronic book
020 $a9780197509630$qelectronic book
020 $a0197509630$qelectronic book
020 $a9780197509623$q(electronic bk.)
020 $z9780197509616$qhardcover
035 $a(OCoLC)1150866818
037 $a1F23658C-EFC9-44DC-B058-9B9CC33A669C$bOverDrive, Inc.$nhttp://www.overdrive.com
042 $apcc
050 04 $aJF1525.D4$bH44 2020
082 00 $a352.3/301$223
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aHeath, Joseph,$d1967-$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe machinery of government :$bpublic administration and the liberal state /$cJoseph Heath.
264 1 $aNew York, NY :$bOxford University Press,$c[2020]
300 $a1 online resource (xii, 423 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 $a"Political theorists are aware that the old-fashioned model of state power, according to which elected officials make policy decisions, which are then faithfully enacted by a loyal cadre of public servants, is hopelessly outdated. The complexity of the modern state, not to mention the difficulty of the economic and social problems it confronts, is such that a great deal of rule-making power is delegated to public servants. Yet if public servants are not merely in the business of administration, but are also deciding questions of policy, how are they making these decisions, and what normative principles inform their judgments? The Machinery of Government attempts to answer this question. The central challenge involves reconciling the tension between the traditional commitment to political neutrality on the part of the civil service with the fact that administrative discretion inevitably involves making normative judgments. State employees are in many cases unable to do their job effectively without some conception of where the public interest lies. It seems inevitable that this will conflict with the commitment to political neutrality, since this conception of the public interest may be tension with that of elected officials. The solution to the dilemma lies in an understanding of the constraints that liberalism imposes upon popular sovereignty in a liberal-democratic polity. Not only do courts play an important role in checking the power of democratic publics, the executive branch is also the custodian of certain fundamental liberal principles"--$cProvided by publisher.
505 0 $aCover -- The Machinery of Government -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Taking Public Administration Seriously -- 1.1 Inside the machine -- 1.2 Beyond discretion -- 1.3 Administrative power -- 1.4 The permanent civil service -- 1.5 Political neutrality -- 1.6 Liberalism or democracy? -- 1.7 Conclusion -- 2. A General Framework for the Ethics of Public Administration -- 2.1 Preliminary clarification -- 2.2 Three models of accountability -- 2.3 The hierarchical model -- 2.4 The popular model -- 2.5 The vocational model -- 2.6 Conclusion -- 3. Liberalism: From Classical to Modern
505 0 $a3.1 Before liberalism -- 3.2 The rise of classical liberalism -- 3.3 The triumph of classical liberalism -- 3.4 The decline of classical liberalism -- 3.5 The rise of modern liberalism -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 4. Efficiency and the Rise of the Welfare State -- 4.1 The egalitarian model -- 4.2 The communitarian model -- 4.3 The public-​economic model -- 4.4 Assessing the models -- 4.5 Wagner's law -- 4.6 The rent-​seeking view -- 4.7 Conclusion -- 5. Cost-​Benefit Analysis as an Expression of Liberal Neutrality -- 5.1 Embedded CBA -- 5.2 Provision of a public good -- 5.3 Imposing a regulation
505 0 $a5.4 Assessing safety -- 5.5 Rationing healthcare -- 5.6 Environmental goods -- 5.7 The three-​step procedure -- 5.8 Conclusion -- 6. Administrative Discretion and the Rule of Law -- 6.1 Discretion -- 6.2 Varieties of discretion -- 6.3 Discretionary enforcement -- 6.4 The morality of law -- 6.5 Administrative law -- 6.6 Conclusion -- 7. Paternalism and Individual Freedom -- 7.1 Mill's argument -- 7.2 Bureaucratic paternalism -- 7.3 The Harm Principle -- 7.4 Hyperbolic discounting -- 7.5 Cognitive bias -- 7.6 The nudge framework -- 7.7 Conclusion -- 8. Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index
588 $aDescription based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on July 30, 2020).
650 0 $aPublic administration$xDecision making.
650 0 $aCivil service ethics.
650 0 $aPublic interest.
650 7 $aCivil service ethics.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00862847
650 7 $aPublic administration$xDecision making.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01081996
650 7 $aPublic interest.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01082535
655 4 $aElectronic books.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aHeath, Joseph, 1967-$tThe machinery of government$dNew York, New York, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2020.$z9780197509616$w(DLC) 2019055825
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14934017$zAll EBSCO eBooks
852 $blweb