Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-030.mrc:201974576:3374 |
Source | marc_columbia |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-030.mrc:201974576:3374?format=raw |
LEADER: 03374cam a2200481Ii 4500
001 14945818
005 20200824100520.0
008 200506s2020 cauab b 000 0 eng d
024 $a40030024505
035 $a(OCoLC)on1162369963
040 $aRSM$beng$erda$cRSM$dOCLCO$dYDXIT
020 $a9781977401489$qpaperback
020 $a1977401481$qpaperback
024 7 $a10.7249/RR2706$2doi
027 $aRAND/RR-2706-RC
035 $a(OCoLC)1162369963
037 $c$39.00
050 4 $aCC135$b.S27 2020
082 04 $a363.6/9$223
100 1 $aSargent, Matthew,$eauthor.
245 10 $aTracking and disrupting the illicit antiquities trade with open-source data /$cMatthew Sargent, James V. Marrone, Alexandra Evans, Bilyana Lilly, Erik Nemeth, Stephen Dalzell.
264 1 $aSanta Monica, CA :$bRAND,$c2020.
300 $axix, 145 pages :$billustrations, maps ;$c26 cm
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $aunmediated$bn$2rdamedia
338 $avolume$bnc$2rdacarrier
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 133-144).
505 0 $aIntroduction -- Antiquities Trafficking and Its Role in Financing Terrorism -- Smuggling Networks and Sales Channels: Results from Interviews -- Antiquities Trafficking Online -- Measuring the International Trade in Antiquities -- Policy Responses to Illicit Trafficking and Future Research -- Appendix A: Archaeological Looting in Historical Perspective -- Appendix B: Detecting Suspicious Dealers Using Rare Indicator Coins -- Appendix C: A Supply and Demand Theory of the Antiquities Market.
520 $aThe illicit antiquities market has become an area of concern for policymakers. It is fueled by a well-documented rise in looting at archaeological sites and a fear that the proceeds of such looting may be financing terrorism or rogue states. Efforts to craft effective policy responses are hindered by the lack of data and evidence on two fronts: the size of the market and the network structure of participants. In lieu of reliable evidence on these two fronts, the conversation has been dominated by speculation and hypotheses and has generated some widely accepted theories of how the illicit antiquities market operates. In this report, the authors compile evidence from numerous open sources to outline the major policy-relevant characteristics of that market and to propose the way forward for developing policies intended to disrupt illicit networks. The approach uses multiple methods and data sources, with the understanding that no single piece of evidence can provide a complete picture of the market and that only by cross-referencing and triangulating among various sources can salient market characteristics be illuminated.
530 $aAlso available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.
650 0 $aArchaeological thefts.
650 0 $aArt thefts.
650 0 $aAntiquities$xCollection and preservation.
650 0 $aCultural property$xProtection.
650 0 $aBlack market.
700 1 $aMarrone, James V.,$eauthor.
700 1 $aEvans, Alexandra,$eauthor.
700 1 $aLilly, Bilyana,$eauthor.
700 1 $aNemeth, Erik J.,$eauthor.
700 1 $aDalzell, Stephen,$eauthor.
710 2 $aRand Corporation.$bHomeland Security Operational Analysis Center,$econtributor.
710 2 $aRand Corporation,$econtributor.
852 00 $bavelc$hCC135$i.S27 2020