Record ID | marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-030.mrc:53453996:5950 |
Source | marc_columbia |
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001 14669027
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008 100827s2009 enkb ob 000 0 eng d
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024 7 $a10.4324/9780203717707$2doi
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050 4 $aDS79.76$b.H37582 2009
050 4 $aU162$b.A3 no.402
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049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aHashim, Ahmed,$eauthor.
245 10 $aIraq's Sunni insurgency /$cAhmed S. Hashim.
264 1 $aAbingdon, U.K. :$bRoutledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies,$c[2009]
300 $a1 online resource (89 pages) :$bmap
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aAdelphi paper ;$v402
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
505 0 $aIraq : a history of violence -- Origins, causes and composition -- Origins and causes -- Composition -- Ideology -- Ba'athists and their affiliates -- Nationalist-Islamists and their affiliates -- Iraqi Salafists -- AQM and its affiliates -- Objectives and strategies -- Organisation, targeting, operational art and tactics -- Internal structures and organisation -- Targeting, operational art and tactics -- The insurgency's internal and external problems -- Not a national war of liberation -- Factionalism and rivalry -- Incoherence at the centre of political power -- Sanctuaries and external support -- Conclusion.
520 $aFrom 2003 to 2008, the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq posed a key challenge to political stability in the country and to Coalition objectives there. This paper explains the onset, composition and evolution of this insurgency. It begins by addressing both its immediate and deeper sociopolitical origins, and goes on to examine the multiple ideological strands within the insurgency and their often conflicting methods and goals. Despite organisational incoherence due to the existence of a large number of competing groups, the insurgency in Iraq sustained a particularly high tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006, causing considerable military and civilian casualties. Some insurgent groups focused on attempting to foment civil war between two of Iraq's major communities, the Sunni and Shia Arabs and, by late 2006, they had come close to unraveling Iraq and presenting the Coalition with a major defeat. The adoption of a new approach by the US in 2007 helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In addition, deep fissures within the insurgency itself, between those fighting for more practical, immediate goals and the transnational Islamists and their local allies fighting for wider-reaching goals -- including the promotion of sectarian strife -- contributed to the insurgency's diminution. It remains to be seen whether there will be a widespread recognition among Sunni Iraqis of the need to work with the Coalition to facilitate their community's reintegration into the new Iraqi body politic.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
506 $3Use copy$fRestrictions unspecified$2star$5MiAaHDL
533 $aElectronic reproduction.$b[Place of publication not identified] :$cHathiTrust Digital Library,$d2010.$5MiAaHDL
538 $aMaster and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.$uhttp://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212$5MiAaHDL
583 1 $adigitized$c2010$hHathiTrust Digital Library$lcommitted to preserve$2pda$5MiAaHDL
650 0 $aSunnites$zIraq.
650 0 $aInsurgency$zIraq.
650 0 $aCounterinsurgency$zIraq.
650 6 $aSunnites$zIrak.
650 6 $aRévoltes$zIrak.
650 6 $aContre-rébellion$zIrak.
650 7 $aHISTORY$xMilitary$xIraq War (2003- )$2bisacsh
650 7 $aCounterinsurgency.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00881325
650 7 $aInsurgency.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00975461
650 7 $aSunnites.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01138714
651 7 $aIraq.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01205757
650 7 $aAufstand$2gnd
650 7 $aPolitische Stabilität$2gnd
650 7 $aSunniten$2gnd
651 7 $aIrak$2gnd
655 4 $aElectronic books.
710 2 $aInternational Institute for Strategic Studies,$eissuing body.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aHashim, Ahmed.$tIraq's Sunni insurgency.$dAbingdon, U.K. : Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009$w(DLC) 2009286895$w(OCoLC)310391474
830 0 $aAdelphi papers ;$vno. 402.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14669027$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS