MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 04733cam a2200625 a 4500
001 14680588
005 20211216220859.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 130624s2013 enka ob 001 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)850078596
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn850078596
035 $a(NNC)14680588
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020 $a9780203098172$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a020309817X$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a9781136225826$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a113622582X$q(electronic bk.)
020 $z9780415629935
020 $z0415629934
050 4 $aHF1413.5$b.B55 2013eb
072 7 $aPOL$x033000$2bisacsh
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049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aBlanchard, Jean-Marc F.,$d1962-
245 10 $aEconomic statecraft and foreign policy :$bsanctions, incentives and target state calculations /$cJean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman.
260 $aMilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge,$c2013.
300 $a1 online resource (xiv, 266 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
347 $adata file
490 1 $aRoutledge global security studies
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
588 0 $aPrint version record.
505 0 $a1. A political theory of economic statecraft -- 2. American economic incentives to Jordan, 1993-994 -- 3. International incentives to Hungary and Romania after the Cold War -- 4. Japanese economic incentives and the Northern Territories dispute, 1985-1999 -- 5. Threatened Arab League sanctions against Canada in 1979 -- 6. Indian sanctions against Nepal, 1988-1990 -- 7. Economic sanctions against South Africa, 1978-1994 -- 8. Economic statecraft and target state calculations : conclusions and implications.
520 $aThis book develops a unified theory of economic statecraft to clarify when and how sanctions and incentives can be used effectively to secure meaningful policy concessions. High-profile applications of economic statecraft have yielded varying degrees of success. The mixed record of economic incentives and economic sanctions in many cases raises important questions. Under what conditions can states modify the behaviour of other states by offering them tangible economic rewards or by threatening to disrupt existing economic relations? To what extent does the success of economic statecraft depend on the magnitude of economic penalties and rewards? In order to answer these questions, this book develops two analytic models: one weighs the threats economic statecraft poses to the Target's Strategic Interests (TSI); while the other (stateness) assesses the degree to which the target state is insulated from domestic political pressures that senders attempt to generate or exploit. Through a series of carefully crafted case studies, including African apartheid and Japanese incentives to obtain the return of the Northern Territories, the authors demonstrate how their model can yield important policy insights in regards to contemporary economic sanctions and incentives cases, such as Iran and North Korea. This book will be of much interest to students of statecraft, sanctions, diplomacy, foreign policy, and international security in general.
650 0 $aEconomic sanctions.
650 0 $aInternational economic relations.
650 0 $aNational security.
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xInternational Relations$xGeneral.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xInternational Relations$xDiplomacy.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xPolitical Freedom & Security$xInternational Security.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE$xGlobalization.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aEconomic sanctions.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00902060
650 7 $aInternational economic relations.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00976891
650 7 $aNational security.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01033711
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aRipsman, Norrin M.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aBlanchard, Jean-Marc F., 1962-$tEconomic statecraft and foreign policy.$dMilton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York : Routledge, 2013$z9780415629935$w(DLC) 2012047697$w(OCoLC)781675356
830 0 $aRoutledge global security studies.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio14680588$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS