MARC Record from marc_columbia

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020 $a9781135626761$q(electronic bk.)
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020 $a0203371100$q(electronic bk.)
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049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aPopper, Karl R.$q(Karl Raimund),$d1902-1994.
240 10 $aBeiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie.$lEnglish
245 14 $aThe two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge /$cKarl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel.
264 1 $aLondon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge,$c2009.
300 $a1 online resource (xl, 510 pages) :$billustrations
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aRoutledge Classics
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
505 0 $aA brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance -- Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth Exposition [1933] -- Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis) -- Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge -- Formulation of the Problem -- The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation -- Deductivtsm and Inductivism -- Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions -- Rationalism and empiricism-deductivism and inductivism -- The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge -- The Problem of Induction -- The infinite regression (Hume's argument) --The inductivist positions -- The Normal-Statement Positions -- The normal-statement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism -- Critique of strict positivism -- twofold transcendence of natural laws -- The transcendental method -- presentation of apriorism -- Critique of apriorism -- Kant and Fries -- Supplement to the critique of apriorism. (Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.-On the question of the empirical basis.) -- Probability Positions -- The probability positions -- subjective belief in probability -- Statements about the objective probability of events -- Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements -- One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity -- The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis -- positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration -- The infinite regression of probability statements -- Pseudo-Statement Positions -- The pseudo-statement positions: new formulation of the problem -- Natural laws as "instructions for the formation of statements" -- "True -- false" or "useful -- useless"? Consistent pragmatism --Difficulties of consistent pragmatism -- Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs -- Natural laws as propositional functions -- Conventionalism -- The pseudo-statement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism -- The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism) -- Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation -- Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications -- Can axiomatic-deductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudo-statements)? -- The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications -- Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry -- Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements -- Implication and general implication -- General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements -- Universal concept and individual concept-class and element -- Strictly universal statements-the problem of induction and the problem of universals -- Comments on the problem of universals -- Back to the Pseudo-Statement Positions -- Return to the discussion of the pseudo-statement positions -- Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws? -- The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudo-statements -- An infinite regression of pseudo-statements -- An apriorist pseudo-statement position -- Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments on the unity of theory and practice -- A last chance for the pseudo-statement positions -- Pseudo-Statement Positions and the Concept of Meaning -- The concept of meaning and logical positivism -- The concept of meaning and the demarcation problem-the fundamental thesis of inductivism -- Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning -- Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statements-the antinomy of the knowability of the world. (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudo-statement positions.) -- The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution -- Is the problem of induction solved?
520 $aReporting in great detail on important research Popper carried out between 1930 and 1933, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie" was not published in German until 1979. The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science. Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrate theory of falsifiability. He argues that science is separated from non-science not by the verifiability but by the falsifiability of its theories. He argues also that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start out from observations and proceed to generalise them, as many presume, but start with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures. "The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge" contains the seed of many of the celebrated arguments that were later to find definitive expression in Popper's most celebrated work, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery"--Publisher description
588 0 $aPrint version record.
650 0 $aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0 $aInduction (Logic)
650 0 $aExperience.
650 6 $aThéorie de la connaissance.
650 6 $aInduction (Logique)
650 6 $aExpérience.
650 7 $aepistemology.$2aat
650 7 $aPHILOSOPHY$xEpistemology.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aExperience.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00918379
650 7 $aInduction (Logic)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00970736
650 7 $aKnowledge, Theory of.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00988194
650 17 $aInductie (logica)$2gtt
650 17 $aFalsificatie (filosofie)$2gtt
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aPickel, Andreas.
700 1 $aHansen, Troels Eggers.
776 08 $iPrint version:$aPopper, Karl R. (Karl Raimund), 1902-1994.$sBeiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. English.$tTwo fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge$z9780415394314$w(DLC) 2008007767$w(OCoLC)212627154
830 0 $aRoutledge classics.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio15099202$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS