MARC Record from marc_columbia

LEADER: 05589cam a2200745 i 4500
001 15100666
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006 m o d
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008 140719s2013 enk o 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn884014194
035 $a(NNC)15100666
040 $aEBLCP$beng$epn$cEBLCP$dN$T$dE7B$dOCLCQ$dOCLCF$dOCLCQ$dK6U$dOCLCO$dOCLCQ
019 $a889313826
020 $a9781317851844$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a1317851846$q(electronic bk.)
020 $a9781315830094$q(e-book)
020 $a1315830094$q(e-book)
020 $z9780415296076
035 $a(OCoLC)884014194$z(OCoLC)889313826
050 4 $aBF455$b.B48 2013
072 7 $aPHI$x009000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aPHI$x016000$2bisacsh
082 04 $a190
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aBlanshard, Brand,$d1892-1987.
245 14 $aThe Nature of Thought.$nVolume 2 /$cBrand Blanshard.
260 $aLondon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge, Taylor & Francis Group,$c2013.
300 $a1 online resource (533 pages)
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1 $aMuirhead Library of Philosophy ;$vVolume 17
588 0 $aPrint version record.
505 0 $aCover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Original Title Page; Original Copyright Page; Table of Contents; BOOK III THE MOVEMENT OF REFLECTION; CHAPTER XVIII THE GENERAL NATURE OF UNDERSTANDING; 1. Reflection is guided by an ideal of intelligibility; 2. Definition of this ideal is indispensable to both logic and the psychology of reasoning; 3. The ideal is that of necessity within a system; 4. This illustrated in a simple system; 5. And in systems slightly more complex; 6. The end is implicit in all questions; 7. In ordinary thought it takes very various forms.
505 8 $a8. The logical and psychological aims of the present workCHAPTER XIX HOW REFLECTION STARTS; 1. The rise of reflection is not explained by physical stimuli or practical necessity; 2. It implies a tension or conflict within the theoretic impulse itself; 3. A tension required and clarified by our theory of thought; 4. And recognized in various forms by many philosophers; 5. The ultimate questions about the origin of thought are unanswerable; 6. Reflection springs from a challenge of fragment to system within the domain of theory: examples.
505 8 $a7. Though the situation producing the challenge is usually non theoretical8. Degree of reflectiveness depends on sensitiveness to such challenges; 9. Which in turn requires (a) an appropriate whole to start from; 10. A fact attesting the importance for reflection of special knowledge; 11. Which, however, is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition; 12. (b) A demand from without for readjustment; 13. Which is the condition of both social and individual advance; 14. (c) Normality in certain conditions of body and mind; stupidity considered; 15. Summary; CHAPTER XX SPECIFYING THE PROBLEM.
505 8 $a1. To reflect with point requires the specification of the question2. A process whose length and difficulty vary with the problem; 3. Such specification is required by the nature of thought; 4. And skill in it is essential to successful teacher or expositor; 5. Though such skill may be less marked in more inventive minds; 6. An example of specification; 7. Only in appearance are discoveries ever made by chance; CHAPTER XXI OBSERVATION; 1. Specification of the problem may not suffice to arouse suggestion; 2. In which case the desideratum is more data.
505 8 $a3. The three functions of observation and experiment4. Observation supplies a base for the leap of suggestion; 5. Though it is narrowly and rigidly limited; 6. Mistakes in observation are chiefly due to its domination by theory; 7. Though a degree of control by theory is inevitable; 8. Such domination may (1) make us observe the wrong things (a) by fixing upon the irrelevant; 9. (b) By unfair stresses within the relevant; 10. (c) By creation of evidence out of hand; 11. It may (2) make us miss the right things through failing to note (a) part of a whole; 12. Or (b) exceptions to a rule.
500 $a13. What is fallacious is not non-observation, but the inference based upon it.
520 $aFirst published in 1939. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
650 0 $aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0 $aMeaning (Psychology)
650 0 $aNecessity (Philosophy)
650 0 $aThought and thinking.
650 0 $aTruth.
650 6 $aThéorie de la connaissance.
650 6 $aSignification (Psychologie)
650 6 $aNécessité (Philosophie)
650 6 $aPensée.
650 6 $aVérité.
650 7 $aepistemology.$2aat
650 7 $athinking.$2aat
650 7 $atruth.$2aat
650 7 $aPHILOSOPHY$xHistory & Surveys$xGeneral.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPHILOSOPHY$xHistory & Surveys$xModern.$2bisacsh
650 7 $aKnowledge, Theory of.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00988194
650 7 $aMeaning (Psychology)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01013157
650 7 $aNecessity (Philosophy)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01035337
650 7 $aThought and thinking.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01150249
650 7 $aTruth.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01158235
776 08 $iPrint version:$aBlanshard, Brand.$tNature of Thought. Volume II.$dHoboken : Taylor and Francis, ©2014$z9780415296076
830 0 $aMuirhead library of philosophy ;$vVolume 17.
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio15100666$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS