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MARC Record from marc_columbia

Record ID marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-031.mrc:387922591:7827
Source marc_columbia
Download Link /show-records/marc_columbia/Columbia-extract-20221130-031.mrc:387922591:7827?format=raw

LEADER: 07827cam a2200769 i 4500
001 15344126
005 20220507233230.0
006 m o d
007 cr cnu---unuuu
008 201006t20212021enkab o 000 0 eng d
035 $a(OCoLC)on1202874275
035 $a(NNC)15344126
040 $aUKMGB$beng$erda$epn$cUKMGB$dOCLCO$dOCLCF$dYDX$dTEFOD$dTYFRS$dOCLCO$dN$T$dUKAHL$dORMDA$dOCLCO
015 $aGBC0G0467$2bnb
020 $a9781000292916$qelectronic book
020 $a1000292916$qelectronic book
020 $a1000292975$qelectronic book
020 $a9781000292947$qelectronic book
020 $a1000292940$qelectronic book
020 $a9781003130826$qelectronic book
020 $a1003130828$qelectronic book
020 $a9781000292978$q(electronic bk.)
020 $z9780367491154$qhardcover
035 $a(OCoLC)1202874275
037 $aEB5263C4-E539-4A15-BB1B-0DB5B2D9723C$bOverDrive, Inc.$nhttp://www.overdrive.com
037 $a9781003130826$bTaylor & Francis
037 $a9781000292978$bO'Reilly Media
043 $an-us---
050 4 $aQA76.9.A25$bB596 2021
072 7 $aPOL$x012000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aPOL$x037000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aBUS$x082000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aGTJ$2bicssc
082 04 $a005.8$223
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aBochman, Andrew A.,$eauthor.
245 10 $aCountering cyber sabotage :$bintroducing consequence-driven, cyber-informed engineering (CCE) /$cAndrew A. Bochman and Sarah Freeman.
264 1 $aAbingdon, Oxon ;$aBoca Raton, FL :$bCRC Press,$c2021.
264 4 $c©2021
300 $a1 online resource (xxxvii, 276 pages) :$billustrations (chiefly color), color map
336 $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
588 $aDescription based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on December 23, 2020).
520 $aCountering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable. Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.
545 0 $aAndy Bochman is the Senior Grid Strategist for Idaho National Laboratory's National and Homeland Security directorate. In this role, Mr. Bochman provides strategic guidance on topics at the intersection of grid security and resilience to INL leadership as well as senior US and international government and industry leaders. A frequent speaker, writer, and trainer, Mr. Bochman has provided analysis on electric grid and energy sector infrastructure security actions, standards, and gaps to the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), and most of the US state utility commissions. Teaming with DOE, NARUC, USAID, and international partners, he has cyber-trained grid operators, and is a cybersecurity subject matter expert listed with the US State Department Speakers Bureau. Mr. Bochman has testifi ed before the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on energy infrastructure cybersecurity issues and before FERC on the security readiness of smart grid cybersecurity standards. He has also held recurring conversations on grid security matters with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to joining INL, he was the Global Energy & Utilities Security Lead at IBM and a Senior Advisor at the Chertoff Group in Washington, DC. Mr. Bochmanearned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the Harvard University Extension School. Sarah Freeman is an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) cyber security analyst at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), where she provides US government partners and private sector entities with actionable cyber threat intelligence, developing innovative security solutions for the critical infrastructure within the US. At Idaho National Laboratory, Ms. Freeman pursues innovative threat analysis and cyber defense approaches, most recently Consequence driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE). As Principle Investigator on a laboratory discretionary research, her current research is focused on new signatures and structured methods for cyber adversary characterization. Following the December 2015 electric grid attacks, Ms. Freeman participated in the DOE-sponsored training for Ukrainian asset owners in May 2016. She has also researched the Ukrainian 2015 and 2016 cyber-attacks and the Trisis/Hatman incident. Ms. Freemanearned a Bachelor of Arts from Grinnell College and a Master's in Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Pittsburgh.
650 0 $aComputer security$zUnited States.
650 0 $aComputer crimes$zUnited States$xPrevention.
650 0 $aAutomation$xSecurity measures.
650 0 $aInfrastructure (Economics)$zUnited States.
650 0 $aNational security$zUnited States.
650 6 $aSécurité informatique$zÉtats-Unis.
650 6 $aAutomatisation$xSécurité$xMesures.
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / International Security$2bisacsh
650 7 $aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Terrorism$2bisacsh
650 7 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industrial Management$2bisacsh
650 7 $aAutomation$xSecurity measures.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01351984
650 7 $aComputer crimes$xPrevention.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00872068
650 7 $aComputer security.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00872484
650 7 $aInfrastructure (Economics)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00973275
650 7 $aNational security.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01033711
651 7 $aUnited States.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01204155
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aFreeman, Sarah G.,$eauthor.
776 08 $iPrint version:$z9780367491154
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio15344126$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS