MARC Record from marc_columbia

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001 15528666
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035 $a(OCoLC)on1230564835
035 $a(NNC)15528666
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019 $a1303412712
020 $a9781000342864$q(ePub ebook)
020 $a1000342867
020 $a9781000342802$q(PDF ebook)
020 $a1000342808
020 $a9781003023654$q(ebook)
020 $a1003023657
020 $a9781000342833$q(electronic bk. : Mobipocket)
020 $a1000342832$q(electronic bk. : Mobipocket)
020 $z9780367901011 (hbk.)
024 8 $a10.4324/9781003023654$2doi
035 $a(OCoLC)1230564835$z(OCoLC)1303412712
037 $a9781000342864$bIngram Content Group
037 $a9781003023654$bTaylor & Francis
050 4 $aHN18.3
072 7 $aPHI$x004000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aPHI$x034000$2bisacsh
072 7 $aHPK$2bicssc
082 04 $a306$223
049 $aZCUA
100 1 $aBroncano, F.$q(Fernando),$eauthor.
245 14 $aThe philosophy of group polarization :$bepistemology, metaphysics, psychology /$cFernando Broncano-Berrocal, J. Adam Carter.
250 $a1st.
264 1 $aLondon :$bRoutledge,$c2021.
300 $a1 online resource.
336 $atext$2rdacontent
337 $acomputer$2rdamedia
338 $aonline resource$2rdacarrier
490 0 $aRoutledge studies in epistemology
500 $a<P>Preface</P><P>Chapter 1. The Philosophy of Polarization Phenomena</P><P>Chapter 2. The Psychology of Group Polarization</P><P>Chapter 3. The Epistemology of Group Polarization</P><P>Chapter 4. Four Models of Group Polarization</P><P>Chapter 5. The Reductive Virtue/Vice Model</P><P>Chapter 6. The Collective Heuristic/Bias Model</P><P>Chapter 7. The Reductive Heuristic/Bias Model</P><P>Chapter 8. The Collective Virtue/Vice Model</P><P>Chapter 9. Mitigating the Epistemic Pitfalls of Group Polarization</P><P>Concussion: Future Directions</P>
588 $aDescription based on CIP data; resource not viewed.
520 $aGroup polarization--the tendency of groups to incline toward more extreme positions than initially held by their individual members--has been rigorously studied by social psychologists, though in a way that has overlooked important philosophical questions. This is the first book-length treatment of group polarization from a philosophical perspective. The phenomenon of group polarization raises several important metaphysical and epistemological questions. From a metaphysical point of view, can group polarization, understood as an epistemic feature of a group, be reduced to epistemic features of its individual members? Relatedly, from an epistemological point of view, is group polarization best understood as a kind of cognitive bias or rather in terms of intellectual vice? This book compares four models that combine potential answers to the metaphysical and epistemological questions. The models considered are: group polarization as (i) a collective bias; (ii) a summation of individual epistemic vices; (iii) a summation of individual biases; and (iv) a collective epistemic vice. Ultimately, the authors defend a collective vice model of group polarization over the competing alternatives. The Philosophy of Group Polarization will be of interest to students and researchers working in epistemology, particularly those working on social epistemology, collective epistemology, social ontology, virtue epistemology, and distributed cognition. It will also be of interest to those working on issues in political epistemology, applied epistemology, and on topics at the intersection of epistemology and ethics.
545 0 $aFernando Broncano-Berrocal is a Ramón y Cajal fellow at the University of Barcelona, Spain. He works mainly in epistemology, with an emphasis on virtue epistemology, philosophy of luck, social epistemology, and collective epistemology. He is the co-editor, with J. Adam Carter, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in such places as Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Synthese , and Erkenntnis . J. Adam Carter is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. His expertise is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on virtue epistemology, social epistemology, relativism, know-how, epistemic luck, and epistemic defeat. He is the author of Metaepistemology and Relativism (2016), co-author of A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (2018), and co-editor, with Fernando Broncano- Berrocal, of The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (Routledge, 2021). His work has appeared in Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, Analysis , and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy .
650 0 $aPolarization (Social sciences)
650 0 $aSocial groups.
650 0 $aDistributed cognition.
650 0 $aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 6 $aPolarisation collective.
650 6 $aCognition distribuée.
650 6 $aThéorie de la connaissance.
650 7 $aepistemology.$2aat
650 7 $aPHILOSOPHY / Epistemology$2bisacsh
650 7 $aDistributed cognition.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01741266
650 7 $aKnowledge, Theory of.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst00988194
650 7 $aPolarization (Social sciences)$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01068309
650 7 $aSocial groups.$2fast$0(OCoLC)fst01122482
655 4 $aElectronic books.
700 1 $aCarter, J. Adam,$d1980-$eauthor.
776 08 $iPrint version:$z9780367901011
856 40 $uhttp://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio15528666$zTaylor & Francis eBooks
852 8 $blweb$hEBOOKS