| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part01.utf8:217699148:1649 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part01.utf8:217699148:1649?format=raw |
LEADER: 01649cam a22003137a 4500
001 00712228
003 DLC
005 20010302111554.0
008 001130s1999 dcu bs i000 0 eng d
010 $a 00712228
035 $a(OCoLC)ocm42438957
040 $aDJB$cDJB$dDLC
042 $alccopycat
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57$bP63 no. 2183
100 1 $aDemirgüç-Kunt, Aslı,$d1961-
245 10 $aMarket discipline and financial safety net design /$cAslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga.
260 $aWashington, DC :$bWorld Bank, Development Research Group, Finance,$c[1999]
300 $a44 p. ;$c28 cm.
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v2183
500 $a"September 1999"--Cover.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 28-29).
520 $aIt is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.
530 $aAlso available on the World Wide Web.
650 0 $aBanks and banking.
650 0 $aDeposit insurance.
700 1 $aHuizinga, Harry.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.$bDevelopment Research Group.$bFinance.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers ;$v2183.
856 41 $3Abstract and full text;$zfull text available in pdf format at same site;$uhttp://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/wps2000series/wps2183/wps2183-abstract.html