MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 04133cam a2200289 a 4500
001 99170200
003 DLC
005 20050607133744.0
008 990205s1999 gw a b 101 0 ger d
010 $a 99170200
020 $a3906759261
035 $a(OCoLC)40621987
040 $aAZU$cAZU$dDLC
042 $alccopycat
050 00 $aPT2607.O35$bZ7162 1997
082 00 $a833/.912$221
111 2 $aInternationales Alfred Döblin-Kolloquium$n(11th :$d1997 :$cLeipzig, Germany)
245 10 $aInternationales Alfred-Döblin-Kolloquium, Leipzig 1997 /$cherausgegeben von Ira Lorf und Gabriele Sander.
260 $aBern ;$aNew York :$bP. Lang,$cc1999.
300 $a230 p. :$bill. ;$c23 cm.
440 0 $aJahrbuch für internationale Germanistik.$nReihe A,$pKongressberichte ;$vBd. 46
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505 8 $aMachine generated contents note: Acknowledgements page v -- Glossary xi -- Abbreviations xiii -- Introduction 1 -- Part I. THE LIMITS OF 'SOVIETIZATION' -- Chapters -- 1. The original social base of the 'Democratic Republic' -- and its transformations 10 -- The situation in 1980 10 -- Transformations after 1980 16 -- The countryside 17 -- 2. Difficulties in the implementation of the social program -- of the Revolution 20 -- Female emancipation 20 -- The literacy campaign 22 -- The land reform 24 -- 3. The building up of the social base of the Saur -- Revolution and its limits 33 -- The expansion of party membership and its limits 33 -- The expansion of party structures 36 -- ,Agitprop 40 -- Expansion of the social base 46 -- Party militias 48 -- The republic of the notables 50 -- 4. Reluctant concessions and co-optations 54 -- Political approaches 54 -- Religious policy 57 -- Part II. THE AFGHAN REGULAR ARMED FORCES: -- RECONSTRUCTION, REORGANIZATION AND -- STRUCTURAL LIMITS -- 5. Karmal's 'new model army' and its role in the war 65 -- Stages of recovery 67 -- The impact of military operations 70 -- Organizational developments 76 -- 6. The political shortcomings of the armed forces and -- the party response 81 -- Factional infighting 81 -- Desertions 84 -- The party and the armedforces 86 -- 7. The efforts to build up quantitatively the armed forces -- and their limits 89 -- Recruitment 89 -- Levels of manpower 93 -- 8. Attempts to address the strategic problems 95 -- Police operations 95 -- Intelligence operations 98 -- Porous borders 99 -- Strategic reserve 103 -- 9. (In-)Effectiveness of the Afghan armed forces 107 -- Morale and professionalism 107 -- Equipment 112 -- The overall strategic balance 113 -- 10. Perverse effects on the army of the transformations -- caused by the war 116 -- Part III. THE 'PACIFICATION POLICY', 1980-1991 -- 11. The early approaches 120 -- Thefirst strategic and tactical elaborations 120 -- Tribal policy 130 -- 12. The first political strategy of 'pacification' 137 -- The local organs of power 137 -- The National Fatherland Front 142 -- Achievements andfurther initiatives 147 -- 13. The National Reconciliation 154 -- Najibullah: continuity and discontinuity 154 -- National Reconciliation in the countryside 163 -- Impact of the Soviet withdrawal 176 -- 14. Overall considerations on the policy of'pacification' 186 -- Achievements 186 -- Solidity and limits of the pacification policy 192 -- Part IV. THE ROLE OF THE MILITIAS -- 15. Origins of the militia system 198 -- 16. The rise in importance of the militias 207 -- 17. The place of the militias in the economy of the war 213 -- Activities of the Militias 213 -- Loyalty of the Militias 216 -- Attempts to increase the reliability of the militias 219 -- 18. Perverse effects of the spread of the militias 225 -- 19. Conclusion: The Fall of Najibullah 232 -- 20. The aftermath: Afghanistan's disintegration 240 -- Appendixes -- A. Statistical Tables 251 -- B. Maps 289 -- C. Graphs 294 -- Bibliography 297 -- Index 313.
600 10 $aDöblin, Alfred,$d1878-1957$xCriticism and interpretation$xCongresses.
700 1 $aSander, Gabriele,$d1955-
700 1 $aLorf, Ira
856 41 $3Table of contents$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy022/99170200.html