| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part30.utf8:148347004:1449 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part30.utf8:148347004:1449?format=raw |
LEADER: 01449cam a22003137a 4500
001 2002616025
003 DLC
005 20080916091254.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 020803s2001 dcu sb i000 0 eng
010 $a 2002616025
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57
100 1 $aBelli, Paolo.
245 10 $aHow adverse selection affects the health insurance market$h[electronic resource] /$cPaolo Belli.
260 $aWashington, D.C. :$bWorld Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics,$c2001.
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v2574
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002.
500 $a"March 2001"--Cover.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 30-31).
520 $aThere may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.
530 $aAlso available in print.
650 0 $aAdverse selection (Insurance)$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aHealth insurance$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aManaged care plans (Medical care)$xMathematical models.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.$bDevelopment Research Group.$bPublic Economics.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers (Online) ;$v2574
856 40 $uhttp://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=1622