| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part30.utf8:148481765:1373 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part30.utf8:148481765:1373?format=raw |
LEADER: 01373cam a22003137a 4500
001 2002616137
003 DLC
005 20040604093809.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 021001s2000 dcu sb i000 0 eng
010 $a 2002616137
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57
100 1 $aPrendergast, Canice.
245 10 $aInvestigating corruption$h[electronic resource] /$cCanice Prendergast.
260 $aWashington, DC :$bWorld Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics,$c[2000]
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v2500
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from title screen as viewed on Oct. 01, 2002.
500 $a"December 2000"--Cover.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 36-37).
520 $aWhy incentive contracts and independent investigations may not be the perfect solution to the problem of bureaucratic corruption.
530 $aAlso available in print.
650 0 $aPolitical corruption$xPrevention$vEconometric models.
650 0 $aBribery$xPrevention$vEconometric models.
650 0 $aPublic administration$xCorrupt practices$xPrevention$vEconometric models.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.$bDevelopment Research Group.$bPublic Economics.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers (Online) ;$v2500.
856 40 $uhttp://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=1310