| Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part31.utf8:129273039:1047 |
| Source | Library of Congress |
| Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part31.utf8:129273039:1047?format=raw |
LEADER: 01047cam a22002897a 4500
001 2003615656
003 DLC
005 20040604102826.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 030430s2003 dcu sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2003615656
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57
100 1 $aBeck, Thorsten.
245 14 $aThe incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution$h[electronic resource] :$bconcepts and country studies /$cThorsten Beck.
260 $aWashington, D.C. :$bWorld Bank,$c[2003]
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v3043
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from title screen as viewed on April 30, 2003.
500 $a"April 29, 2003."
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
530 $aAlso available in print.
650 0 $aDeposit insurance.
650 0 $aBank failures.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers (Online) ;$v3043.
856 40 $uhttp://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=26278