MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02108cam a22003377a 4500
001 2004620312
003 DLC
005 20041130185751.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 041130s2004 gau sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2004620312
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $ae------
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aEisenbeis, Robert A.
245 10 $aAgency problems and goal conflicts$h[electronic resource] /$cRobert A. Eisenbeis.
260 $a[Atlanta, Ga.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,$c[2004]
490 1 $aWorking paper series / Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ;$v2004-24
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 11/30/2004.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions. Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk. The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.
650 0 $aFinancial institutions$zEuropean Union countries.
650 0 $aBanks and banking$zEuropean Union countries.
650 0 $aBank failures$zEuropean Union countries.
653 $aAgency problems;$abanking supervision and regulation;$aEMU;$adeposit insurance
710 2 $aFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta : Online) ;$v2004-24.
856 40 $uhttp://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=AD5DF1A9-F342-A772-ACF2DA5DE3E37B69&method=display