MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02019cam a22003017a 4500
001 2005615545
003 DLC
005 20050204103650.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050112s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615545
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aRajan, Raghuram.
245 10 $aAre perks purely managerial excess?$h[electronic resource] /$cRaghuram Rajan, Julie Wulf.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10494
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Why do some firms tend to offer executives a variety of perks while others offer none at all? A widespread view in the corporate finance literature is that executive perks are a form of agency or private benefit and a way for managers to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates. According to this view, firms with plenty of free cash flow that operate in industries with limited investment prospects should typically offer perks. The theory also suggests that firms that are subject to more external monitoring should have fewer perks. Overall, the evidence for the private benefits explanation is, at best, mixed. We do, however, find evidence that perks are offered most in situations where they are likely to enhance managerial productivity. This suggests that a view of perks that sees them purely as managerial excess is incorrect"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.
700 1 $aWulf, Julie,$d1956-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10494.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W10494