MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02450cam a22003017a 4500
001 2005615671
003 DLC
005 20080909085050.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050112s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615671
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBlanchard, Olivier$q(Olivier J.)
245 14 $aThe optimal design of unemployment insurance and employment protection$h[electronic resource] :$ba first pass /$cOlivier Blanchard, Jean Tirole.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10443
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/12/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Much of the policy discussion of labor market institutions has been at the margin, with proposals to tighten unemployment benefits, reduce employment protection, and so on. There has been little discussion however of what the ultimate goal and architecture should be. The paper focuses on characterizing this ultimate goal, the optimal architecture of labor market institutions. We start our analysis with a simple benchmark, with risk averse workers, risk neutral firms and random shocks to productivity. In this benchmark, we show that optimality requires both unemployment insurance and employment protection---in the form of layoff taxes; it also requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex-post wage bargaining, and heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the architecture must be modified in each case. The scope for insurance may be more limited than in the benchmark; so may the scope for employment protection. The general principle remains however, namely the need to look at unemployment insurance and employment protection together, rather than in isolation"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aUnemployment insurance.
700 1 $aTirole, Jean.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10443.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w10443