Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:68979023:2595 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:68979023:2595?format=raw |
LEADER: 02595cam a22003257a 4500
001 2005615714
003 DLC
005 20050131163113.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050113s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615714
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $as-bl---$ae-uk---$aa-iq---
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aKing, Mervyn J.
245 14 $aThe institutions of monetary policy$h[electronic resource] /$cMervyn King.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10400
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/13/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"I argue that it is useful to think about the optimal design of monetary institutions using the insights from the theory of incomplete contracts. The core of the monetary policy problem is the uncertainty about future social decisions resulting from the impossibility and the undesirability of committing our successors to any given monetary policy strategy. The impossibility stems from the observation that collective decisions cannot be enforced so that it is impossible to commit to future collective decisions. The undesirability reflects the fact that we cannot articulate all possible future states of the world. Monetary institutions expand the possibility frontier of the technology of collective decisions by raising the costs of making inefficient deviations from pre-announced paths. Institutions also become repositories of experience and knowledge to facilitate learning about the economic environment and communication to society as a whole. I illustrate the importance of institutional design for the operation of monetary policy by reference to three case studies: the collapse of exchange rate regimes in Brazil and the United Kingdom; currency arrangements in Iraq and their reform after the 2003 war; and the relationship between central banks and governments when the zero constraint on nominal interest rates is binding"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aForeign exchange rates$zBrazil.
650 0 $aForeign exchange rates$zGreat Britain.
650 0 $aMonetary policy$zIraq.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10400.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W10400