MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02678cam a22003137a 4500
001 2005615815
003 DLC
005 20050113132742.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050113s2004 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005615815
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aFisman, Raymond.
245 10 $aRegulation of entry and the distortion of industrial organization$h[electronic resource] /$cRaymond Fisman, Virginia Sarria-Allende.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2004.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 10929
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/13/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We study the distortions to industrial organization caused by entry regulation. We take advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially affected by country-level entry regulation. In industries with high natural entry barriers, entry regulation has little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry. By contrast, in industries with low natural entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have relatively few, large firms. We find no relation between natural entry barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation. Utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries. Finally, we analyze the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth opportunities. In countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, the response is through the creation of new firms; the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation. Our results suggest that regulation distorts the structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aIndustrial organization (Economic theory)
650 0 $aBarriers to entry (Industrial organization)
700 1 $aSarria-Allende, Virginia.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 10929.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/W10929