MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02097cam a22003137a 4500
001 2005616188
003 DLC
005 20050127155636.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050127s2005 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005616188
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aAtkeson, Andrew.
245 12 $aA dynamic theory of optimal capital structure and executive compensation$h[electronic resource] /$cAndrew Atkeson, Harold L. Cole.
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2005.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 11083
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 1/27/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"We put forward a theory of the optimal capital structure of the firm based on Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that a firm's choice of capital structure is determined by a trade-off between agency costs and monitoring costs. We model this tradeoff dynamically. We assume that early on in the production process, outside investors face an informational friction with respect to withdrawing funds from the firm which dissipates over time. We assume that they also face an agency friction which increases over time with respect to funds left inside the firm. The problem of determining the optimal capital structure of the firm as well as the optimal compensation of the manager is then a problem of choosing payments to outside investors and the manager at each stage of production to balance these two frictions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
650 0 $aCorporations$xFinance$xMathematical models.
650 0 $aExecutives$xSalaries, etc.$xMathematical models.
700 1 $aCole, Harold Linh,$d1957-
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 11083.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w11083