MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02017cam a22003017a 4500
001 2005617025
003 DLC
005 20080130083136.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050303s2003 nyu sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2005617025
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dWaU
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aBroda, Christian,$d1916-1987.
245 10 $aEndogenous deposit dollarization$h[electronic resource] /$cChristian Broda and Eduardo Levy Yeyati.
260 $a[New York, N.Y.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of New York,$c[2003]
490 1 $aStaff reports ;$vno. 160
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 3/3/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard arguments. We develop a model in which banks choose the optimal currency composition of their liabilities. We argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of bank default can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level. The distortion arises because dollar deposits are the only source of default risk in the model, but dollar depositors share the burden of the default with peso depositors. The incentive to dollarize is reinforced by common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance. Our findings suggest that regulators in bi-currency economies would potentially benefit by departing from the currency-blind benchmark and differentiating among currencies in a way that prevents undesirable currency mismatches"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.
650 0 $aDollarization.
700 1 $aLevy Yeyati, Eduardo.
710 2 $aFederal Reserve Bank of New York.
830 0 $aStaff reports (Federal Reserve Bank of New York : Online) ;$vno. 160.
856 40 $uhttp://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr160.html