Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:73975613:3021 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:73975613:3021?format=raw |
LEADER: 03021cam a22003737a 4500
001 2005618634
003 DLC
005 20050816153922.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050816s2005 dcu sb i000 0 eng
010 $a 2005618634
040 $aDLC$cDLC
043 $ae-sz---$aee-----
050 00 $aHG3881.5.W57
100 1 $aDafflon, Bernard.
245 10 $aFiscal federalism in Switzerland$h[electronic resource] :$brelevant issues for transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe /$cBernard Dafflon, Krisztina Toth.
260 $a[Washington, D.C. :$bWorld Bank,$c2005]
490 1 $aPolicy research working paper ;$v3655
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/16/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies. "--World Bank web site.
650 0 $aIntergovernmental fiscal relations$zSwitzerland.
650 0 $aDecentralization in government$zSwitzerland.
651 0 $aSwitzerland$xRegional disparities.
650 0 $aIntergovernmental fiscal relations$zEurope, Eastern.
650 0 $aDecentralization in government$zEurope, Eastern.
651 0 $aEurope, Eastern$xRegional disparities.
700 1 $aTóth, Krisztina.
710 2 $aWorld Bank.
830 0 $aPolicy research working papers (Online) ;$v3655.
856 40 $uhttp://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000016406_20050627090555