Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:74614197:2113 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part33.utf8:74614197:2113?format=raw |
LEADER: 02113cam a22002897a 4500
001 2005619093
003 DLC
005 20050603092932.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 050516s2004 gw sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2005619093
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHD5701
100 1 $aHunt, Jennifer.
245 10 $aTrust and bribery$h[electronic resource] :$bthe role of the quid pro quo and the link with crime /$cby Jennifer Hunt.
260 $aBonn, Germany :$bIZA,$c[2004]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper ;$vno. 1179
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 5/16/2005.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
650 0 $aBribery.
650 0 $aPolitical corruption.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;$vno. 1179
856 40 $uhttp://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1179