Record ID | marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part34.utf8:82637875:2143 |
Source | Library of Congress |
Download Link | /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part34.utf8:82637875:2143?format=raw |
LEADER: 02143cam a22003017a 4500
001 2006618050
003 DLC
005 20060531115349.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 060531s2006 gw sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2006618050
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHD5701
100 1 $aFrancesconi, Marco.
245 10 $aControl rights in public-private partnerships$h[electronic resource] /$cby Marco Francesconi, Abhinay Muthoo.
260 $aBonn, Germany :$bIZA,$c[2006]
490 1 $aDiscussion paper ;$vno. 2143
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 5/31/2006.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two parties that produce impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties' valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party's investment is more important than the other party's. If the parties' investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low-valuation party. If the importance of the parties' investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low-valuation party should receive sole authority. We apply our results to a number of situations, including schools and child custody"--Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit web site.
650 0 $aPublic goods.
650 0 $aResource allocation.
700 1 $aMuthoo, Abhinay.
830 0 $aDiscussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;$vno. 2143
856 40 $uhttp://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=2143