MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 02107cam a22003017a 4500
001 2006618103
003 DLC
005 20130601093429.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 061012s2006 ilu sb f000 0 eng
010 $a 2006618103
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHG2401
100 1 $aCrowley, Meredith.
245 10 $aWhy are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?$h[electronic resource] /$cMeredith A. Crowley.
260 $a[Chicago, Ill.] :$bFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago,$c[2006]
490 1 $aWorking paper series ;$vWP-2006-6
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 10/12/2006.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the use of safeguards in a trade agreement. It then analyzes the available data on the use of safeguards by WTO members to examine two hypotheses in the economics literature, that safeguards improve welfare by facilitating tariff reductions and that safeguards improve welfare by providing insurance against adverse economic shocks. I find that countries which undertook larger tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round conducted more safeguards investigations after the WTO was established. However, this result is not robust across all specifications of the model and should not be regarded as definitive. I find no evidence to support the hypothesis that safeguards improve welfare by providing insurance. The empirical analysis rejects the hypothesis of a relationship between safeguards and aggregate uncertainty."--Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site.
650 0 $aCommercial treaties.
650 0 $aCommercial treaties$xEconometric models.
710 2 $aFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago.$bResearch Department.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Research Department : Online) ;$vWP-2006-6.
856 40 $uhttp://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/wp_abstract.cfm?pubsID=795