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MARC Record from Library of Congress

Record ID marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part34.utf8:83768680:1799
Source Library of Congress
Download Link /show-records/marc_loc_2016/BooksAll.2016.part34.utf8:83768680:1799?format=raw

LEADER: 01799nam a22002777a 4500
001 2006619224
003 DLC
005 20060524093922.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 060524s2006 mau sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2006619224
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHB1
100 1 $aFryer, Roland G.
245 10 $aBelief flipping in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination$h[electronic resource] /$cRoland G. Fryer, Jr..
260 $aCambridge, MA :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$cc2006.
490 1 $aNBER working paper series ;$vworking paper 12174
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 5/24/2006.
530 $aAlso available in print.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
520 3 $a"The literature on statistical discrimination shows that ex-ante identical groups may be differentially treated in discriminatory equilibria. This paper constructs a dynamic model of statistical discrimination and explores what happens to the individuals who nonetheless overcome the initial discrimination. If an employer discriminates against a group of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group when she promotes from within the firm. The worker's welfare implications (i.e. who benefits from an employer's discriminatory hiring practices) are unclear. Even though agents face discrimination initially, some may be better off because of it"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
710 2 $aNational Bureau of Economic Research.
830 0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;$vworking paper no. 12174.
856 40 $uhttp://papers.nber.org/papers/w12174