MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 01979cam a22003017a 4500
001 2006619957
003 DLC
005 20060927090159.0
007 cr |||||||||||
008 060926s2006 enk sb 000 0 eng
010 $a 2006619957
040 $aDLC$cDLC
050 00 $aHC10
100 1 $aLach, Saul.
245 14 $aThe impact of royalty sharing incentives on technology licensing in universities$h[electronic resource] /$cSaul Lach, Mark Schankerman
260 $aLondon :$bCentre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science,$cc2006.
490 0 $aCEP discussion paper ;$vno. 729
538 $aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538 $aMode of access: World Wide Web.
500 $aTitle from PDF file (viewed on Sept. 26, 2006).
500 $a"June 2006."
530 $aAlso available in print.
520 3 $aUsing data on U.S. universities, we show that universities that give higher royalty shares to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for other factors including university size, quality, research funding, and local demand conditions. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the endogeneity of royalty shares. The incentive effects are larger in private universities than in public ones, and we provide survey evidence on performance-based pay, government constraints and objectives of Technology License Offices that helps explain this finding. Royalty incentives work through two channels -- raising faculty effort and sorting scientists across universities. The effect of incentives is mainly to increase the quality rather than the quantity of inventions
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references.
653 $aRoyalty incentives ;$aInvention ;$aTechnology licensing
700 1 $aSchankerman, Mark.
710 2 $aLondon School of Economics and Political Science.$bCentre for Economic Performance.
856 40 $uhttp://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0729.pdf