MARC Record from Library of Congress

LEADER: 05489cam a2200337 a 4500
001 2008007767
003 DLC
005 20100814092811.0
008 080221s2009 enka b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2008007767
020 $a9780415394314 (hardback : alk. paper)
020 $a0415394317 (hardback : alk. paper)
035 $a(OCoLC)ocn212627154
040 $aDLC$cDLC$dBTCTA$dYDXCP$dBAKER$dOCLCG$dBWKUK$dBWK$dNLGGC$dBWX$dCDX$dSGB$dUWW$dDLC
041 1 $aeng$hger
050 00 $aBD163$b.P6413 2009
082 00 $a121$222
084 $a08.32$2bcl
100 1 $aPopper, Karl R.$q(Karl Raimund),$d1902-1994.
240 10 $aBeiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie.$lEnglish
245 14 $aThe two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge /$cKarl Popper ; edited by Troels Eggers Hansen ; translated by Andreas Pickel.
260 $aLondon ;$aNew York :$bRoutledge,$c2009.
300 $axl, 510 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm.
504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
505 0 $aA brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance -- Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth Exposition [1933] -- Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis) -- Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge -- Formulation of the Problem -- The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation -- Deductivtsm and Inductivism -- Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions -- Rationalism and empiricism-deductivism and inductivism -- The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge -- The Problem of Induction -- The infinite regression (Hume's argument) --The inductivist positions -- The Normal-Statement Positions -- The normal-statement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism -- Critique of strict positivism - twofold transcendence of natural laws -- The transcendental method - presentation of apriorism -- Critique of apriorism -- Kant and Fries -- Supplement to the critique of apriorism. (Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.-On the question of the empirical basis.) -- Probability Positions -- The probability positions - subjective belief in probability -- Statements about the objective probability of events -- Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements -- One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity -- The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis - positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration -- The infinite regression of probability statements -- Pseudo-Statement Positions -- The pseudo-statement positions: new formulation of the problem -- Natural laws as "instructions for the formation of statements" -- "True - false" or "useful - useless"? Consistent pragmatism --Difficulties of consistent pragmatism -- Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs -- Natural laws as propositional functions -- Conventionalism -- The pseudo-statement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism -- The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism) -- Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation -- Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications -- Can axiomatic-deductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudo-statements)? -- The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications -- Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry -- Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements -- Implication and general implication -- General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements -- Universal concept and individual concept-class and element -- Strictly universal statements-the problem of induction and the problem of universals -- Comments on the problem of universals -- Back to the Pseudo-Statement Positions -- Return to the discussion of the pseudo-statement positions -- Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws? -- The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudo-statements -- An infinite regression of pseudo-statements -- An apriorist pseudo-statement position -- Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments on the unity of theory and practice -- A last chance for the pseudo-statement positions -- Pseudo-Statement Positions and the Concept of Meaning -- The concept of meaning and logical positivism -- The concept of meaning and the demarcation problem-the fundamental thesis of inductivism -- Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning -- Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statements-the antinomy of the knowability of the world. (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudo-statement positions.) -- The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution -- Is the problem of induction solved?
650 0 $aKnowledge, Theory of.
650 0 $aInduction (Logic)
650 0 $aExperience.
700 1 $aPickel, Andreas.$4trl
700 1 $aHansen, Troels Eggers.
856 41 $3Table of contents only$uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0812/2008007767.html